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Essays on Organization, Creativity, and Globalization
Sungyong Chang
This dissertation examines an underexplored type of innovation - the discovery of
new resources. Schumpeter distinguishes among five types of innovation: new products,
new processes, new organizations, new markets, and new resources. Most prior work
has focused on the first three types of innovation. This study focuses on the last type
of innovation, the discovery of new resources, in creative industries where talent is the
most important resource of creativity and profit. This dissertation is comprised of three
chapters. Each of the chapters examines a strategy or an environmental change such as
unbundling, digitalization, and cross-border acquisition which may facilitate or weaken
the discovery of new talent and experiment with new artists. In the first chapter, I ex-
plore the impact of unbundling on the discovery of new talent. The results highlight
the trade-off between breadth-oriented experimentation (experimenting with more new
alternatives by producing unbundled products) and depth-oriented experimentation (col-
lecting more accurate information on fewer alternatives by producing bundled products)
and suggest that unbundling may facilitate firms’ breadth-oriented experimentation and
the discovery of new talent. In the second chapter, I investigate whether digitalization
(digital market) facilitated the discovery of new talent by entrepreneurial firms. Digital-
ization offers diverse niche opportunities from a long-tail market and decreases the cost of
experimenting with new artists. However, the findings from this chapter suggest that en-
trepreneurial firms did not benefit from such opportunities; iTunes and YouTube did not
facilitate entrepreneurial firms’ discovery of new talent and experimentation with new
artists (compared to incumbent firms). In the third chapter, I turn to look at the impact
of foreign ownership or capital on the discovery of new domestic talent. The “liability
of foreignness” argument suggests that foreign ownership may weaken the discovery of
new talent from the host country because foreign owners may lack a good understanding
of the host country culture. This study analyzes the case of Sony’s acquisition of CBS
Records (a US major label) in 1988, which is the first merger by a Japanese firm with a
firm of a distant culture. The results suggest that Sony did not undermine CBS Records’
discovery of domestic new talent but instead increased the popularity of new domestic
artists in CBS Records and its subsidiaries.
Contents
List of Tables iii
List of Figures v
Acknowledgements vi
Introduction 1
1 Does Unbundling Facilitate Experimentation and the Discovery of New Talent? 5
1.1 Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Related Literature and Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Empirical Context and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.7 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.9 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
i
2 Does Digitalization Facilitate Entrepreneurial firms’ Discovery of New Tal-
ent? The Impact of iTunes and YouTube on the Recorded Music Industry 81
2.1 Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.3 Setting and Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.8 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3 Does Foreign OwnershipWeaken the Discovery of New Talent from the Host
Country? Evidence from Sony’s Acquisition of CBS Records 113
3.1 Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.2 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.3 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
3.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
ii
List of Tables
1.1 Cost of producing a release in the music industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.2 History of staggered entries of iTunes into 29 sample countries . . . . . . 32
1.3 The 20 most popular artists who created at least one new genre . . . . . . 37
1.4 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.5 Does producing singles increase experimenting with new artists? . . . . . 48
1.6 Does producing singles increase omission and commission errors? . . . . . 51
1.7 Does producing singles increase maximum popularity of label’s artists and
songs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.8 Do new artists benefit more than incumbent artists from producing singles? 56
1.9 Do small firms benefit more from producing singles? . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.10 Does producing singles facilitate the discovery of new artists who created
a new genre? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.2 Did iTunes and YouTube facilitate music labels’ discovery of new talent? . 97
2.3 Did iTunes and YouTube facilitate entrepreneurial music labels’ discovery
of new talent? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.4 Contingent effects based on genre: pop-song labels vs non pop-song labels 103
iii
2.5 Did iTunes and YouTube facilitate label founding and experimentations? . 106
3.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.2 (Label-level analysis) Did Sony weaken the discovery of new talent by CBS
record? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
3.3 (Label-level analysis) Did Sony weaken the discovery of domestic talent by
CBS record? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.4 (Label-level analysis) Subgroup analysis: (1) New vs. Incumbent artists and
(2) Domestic vs. Foreign artists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
3.5 (Release level subgroup analysis) Did Sony weaken the discovery of do-
mestic new talent by CBS record? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.6 (Label level analysis - Coefficients and SEs only) Did acquisitions among
major labels weaken the discovery of domestic new talent by acquired labels? 139
iv
List of Figures
1.1 Intuition of the theoretical model on the impact of unbundling on the dis-
covery of new talent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2 A numerical example of the theoretical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3 Introduction of iTunes and single-producing labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.4 Popularity distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.5 Kernel density distribution of the probability of producing at least one single 49
1.6 Does small firms benefit more from producing singles? . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.1 Dynamic Impact of iTunes on the Discovery of New Talent by En-
trepreneurial Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.2 Dynamic Impact of YouTube on the Discovery of New Talent by En-
trepreneurial Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.1 Dynamic impact of Sony’s Acquisition of CBS Records on the Discovery of
US New Talent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.2 Dynamic Impact of Sony’s Acquisition of CBS Records on the Discovery of
Foreign New Talent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
v
Acknowledgements
I would like to express the deepest appreciation tomy PhD advisor, Bruce Kogut, for his in-
sights and guidance over the years. I am also grateful to my committee members - Stephan
Meier, Evan Rawley, Vanessa Burbano, and Bo Cowgill - for their attentive reading of this
dissertation and their thoughtful suggestions. I also thank professors at Columbia, NYU,
and SNU – Richard R. Nelson, Eric Abrahamson, Damon Phillips, Dan Wang, JP Eggers,
Christina Fang, Jaeyong Song, and Jeho Lee who gave insightful suggestions and encour-
agement during my graduate studies.
Special thanks to Kylie Jiwon Hwang, who offered endless moral support for finishing
this dissertation. Also, Kylie read and reread this dissertation many times and provided
helpful suggestions. I would like to thank my best friend Hyunseob Kim for helping me
get through the difficult times. Several others among the graduate students at Columbia
and NYU have been helpful during graduate studies: Daniel Keum, Yoonjin Choi, Jaee
Cho, Ilona Friedman, Eric Anicich, Jinseok Chun, Alice Lee, Jenna Song, Jose Uribe, Ivana
Katic, Mitali Banerjee, Natalie Carlson, Zaijia Liu, and Francis Park.
I gratefully acknowledge scholarship, grants, and funding support from Korea Foun-
dation for Advanced Studies, SNUAlumni Association, and the JeromeA. Chazen Institute
for Global Business, Center for Japanese Economy and Business, and Sanford Bernstein &
vi
Co. Center for Leadership and Ethics at Columbia Business School.
I would like to thankmy family. My brother Sunghoon Chang has been amuch-needed
source of laughter and support, as have my grandparents Sook-ja Lee and Pahn-soo Park
and uncles Hee-mahn Park and Hee-bong Park. Last but foremost, I thank the two spe-
cial people whom I miss every day; I dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my late
parents, Sook-hee Park and Hae-geun Chang who taught me about the joy of living.
vii
Dedicated to my late parents, Sook-hee Park and Hae-geun Chang
viii
Introduction
This dissertation examines an underexplored type of innovation - the discovery of new re-
sources. Schumpeter (1934) distinguishes among five types of innovation: new products,
new processes, new organizations, new markets, and new resources. Most prior work
has focused on the first three types of innovation. This study focuses on the last type
of innovation, the discovery of new resources, in creative industries where talent is the
most important resource of creativity and profit. This dissertation is comprised of three
chapters. Each of the chapters examines a strategy or an environmental change such as
unbundling, digitalization, and cross-border acquisition which may facilitate or weaken
the discovery of new talent and experiment with new artists.
In the first chapter, I explore the impact of unbundling on the discovery of new talent.
Digitalization has engendered a fundamental unbundling of creative goods. In the music
industry, for instance, digitalization has enabled music to be purchased as both individual
songs (i.e., a single) and a bundle of songs (i.e., an album). I explorewhether unbundling fa-
cilitates firms’ experimentation and the discovery of new artists. For this purpose, I study
a model of unbundling and the discovery of new talent and test its empirical implications
in the music industry. To identify a causal effect of unbundling on the discovery of new
talent, I utilize iTunes’ staggered market entries into 29 countries based on a novel dataset
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from multiple large-scale music databases, including Spotify APIs. Consistent with the
theoretical predictions, I find that as unbundling lowers the cost of experimenting with
new artists, single-producing firms have a higher proportion of new artists than album-
only-producing firms. In contrast, as information on artist talent from one-shot unbun-
dled experimentation is less accurate than that from albums, single-producing firms make
more omission errors. Overall, the results suggest that the positive effect of the decreased
cost of experimentation outweighs the negative effect of the loss of information quality
on talent. Thus, single-producing firms discover more popular artists and artists who cre-
ate new markets (genres) than album-only-producing firms. These results highlight the
trade-off between breadth-oriented experimentation (experimenting with more new al-
ternatives) and depth-oriented experimentation (collecting more accurate information on
fewer alternatives) and suggest that unbundling may facilitate firms’ breadth-oriented ex-
perimentation and the discovery of new talent.
In the second chapter, I investigate whether digitalization (digital market) facilitated
the discovery of new talent by entrepreneurial firms. One theoretical argument suggests
that entrepreneurial firms may benefit from digitalization because it offers diverse niche
opportunities from a long-tail market and decreases the cost of experimenting with new
artists. Another theoretical argument challenges this simple positive relationship by ar-
guing that an adverse impact may result from the fact that would-be artists can demon-
strate their talent through many services, such as YouTube or social media, in the digi-
tal age. As incumbent firms also observe these would-be artists who have obvious tal-
ent, the advantage of entrepreneurial firms’ discovery of new talent may be undermined.
By utilizing iTunes’ and YouTube’s staggered market entries into 29 countries, this study
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produces results from a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) specification. The
findings suggest that iTunes and YouTube did not facilitate entrepreneurial firms’ dis-
covery of new talent but decreased the average and maximum popularity of new artists
in entrepreneurial firms. In contrast, entrepreneurial firms increase their reliance on in-
cumbent artists. In short, the average popularity of new artists in entrepreneurial labels
decreased and reached a level similar to the average popularity of new artists in incum-
bent labels. Considering that entrepreneurial firms have relied more on the discovery of
new talent (their proportion of new artists is higher than that in incumbent labels), the
discovery performance of entrepreneurial labels was lower than that of incumbent labels.
Finally, in the third chapter, I examine whether foreign ownership or capital under-
mine the discovery of new domestic talent in the cultural industry. One theoretical argu-
ment suggests that foreign ownership may weaken the discovery of new talent from the
host country because foreign owners may lack a good understanding of the host country
culture (“liability of foreignness”). Another theoretical argument challenges this simple
negative relationship by arguing that foreign ownership may have an offsetting advan-
tage that can be transferred from the home country to a foreign subsidiary at a cost that
outweighs the liability of foreignness. This study focuses on the case of Sony’s acquisition
of CBS Records (a US major label) in 1988, which is the first merger by a Japanese firm
with a firm of a distant culture. The estimates from a difference-in-differences (DD) spec-
ification suggest that Sony did not undermine CBS Records’ discovery of domestic new
talent but rather increased the popularity of new domestic artists in CBS Records and its
sublabels. In contrast, Sony’s acquisition decreased CBS Records’ reliance on incumbent
artists and foreign (outside the US) artists. Finally, I also conduct the same analysis with
3
nine other major mergers and compare the results with the results from Sony’s acquisition




Does Unbundling Facilitate Experimentation and the Discovery
of New Talent?
1.1 Abstract
This study examines an underexplored type of innovation - the discovery of new resources
- in creative industries of the digitalization era. Digitalization has engendered a funda-
mental unbundling of creative goods. In the music industry, for instance, digitalization
has enabled music to be purchased as both individual songs (i.e., a single) and a bundle
of songs (i.e., an album). I explore whether unbundling facilitates firms’ experimentation
and the discovery of new artists. For this purpose, I study a model of unbundling and the
discovery of new talent and test its empirical implications in the music industry. To iden-
tify a causal effect of unbundling on the discovery of new talent, I utilize iTunes’ staggered
market entries into 29 countries based on a novel dataset from multiple large-scale mu-
sic databases, including Spotify APIs. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, I find
that as unbundling lowers the cost of experimenting with new artists, single-producing
firms have 27.25% higher proportion of new artists than album-only-producing firms. In
contrast, as information on artist talent from a one-shot unbundled experimentation is
less accurate than that from albums, single-producing firms make 29.75% more omission
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errors. Overall, the results suggest that the positive effect from the decreased cost of
experimentation outweighs the negative effect from the loss of information quality on
talent. Thus, single-producing firms discover more popular artists and artists who cre-
ate new markets (genres) than album-only-producing firms. These results highlight the
trade-off between breadth-oriented experimentation (experimenting with more new al-
ternatives) and depth-oriented experimentation (collecting more accurate information on
fewer alternatives) and suggest that digitalization may facilitate firms’ breadth-oriented
experimentation and the discovery of new talent.
1.2 Introduction
Schumpeter (1934) distinguishes among five types of innovation: new products, new pro-
cesses, new organizations, new markets, and new resources. Most prior work has focused
on the first three types of innovation (e.g., Abernathy and Utterback 1978, Nelson and
Winter 1982, Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, Kogut and Zander 1992, Tripsas and Gavetti 2000,
Adner and Kapoor 2010, Leiponen and Helfat 2010, Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu 2013).
This study focuses on the last type of innovation, the discovery of new resources, in cre-
ative industries where artist talent - a type of resource - is the most important source of
creativity and profit. The discovery of new talent has become increasingly important in
creative industries as creative industries have transformed into a “super-star” or “winner-
take-all” market in which a few talented artists dominate with respect to industry sales
and profit (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999). In particular, experimenting with new talent is
fundamental in the discovery of new talent because the attributes required for an artist to
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be a successful can hardly be known in advance or deduced from some of set of principles
(e.g., Caves 2000, Benner and Waldfogel 2016).
This study explores the impact of digitalization, a radical technological change, on ex-
perimentation and the discovery of new talent. Digitalization has spurred a fundamental
unbundling of creative industries. As transaction costs are lower in online channels, digi-
talization enables firms to offer single products that were previously sold only or primarily
as a part of bundles (Elberse 2010). While prior work has mainly focused on the impact
of unbundling on industry- and product-level sales (e.g., Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999,
Elberse 2010, Liebowitz 2016) or the impact of online piracy - another phenomenon of dig-
italization - on industry- or product-level sales (e.g., Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf 2007,
Rob and Waldfogel 2007), this study focuses on the impact of unbundling on firm-level
experimentation behavior and its ramifications for the discovery of new artists. Quanti-
tatively assessing experimentation and the discovery of new talent is more challenging
than documenting a reduction or increase in sales. Indeed, determining whether the im-
pact of unbundling on experimentation is positive or negative is far from straightforward,
as unbundling affects both the costs and benefits of experimenting with new artists.
I develop a model describing how unbundling influences the discovery of new talent
and test its empirical implications in the music industry where single products (i.e., “sin-
gles”: a release of a song) and bundled products (i.e., “albums”: a release with multiple
songs) have coexisted since the 19th century. As albums have been the main format of mu-
sic production, many firms have produced only albums, while some firms have produced
both albums and singles. My model proposes that unbundling has two competing effects
on the discovery of new talent. First, as unbundling lowers the cost of experimenting with
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new artists, it may have a positive effect on the discovery of new talent by allowing firms
to experiment with more new artists. This is consistent with the experimentation litera-
ture (e.g., Kulkhani and Simon 1988), which argues that firms are less likely to stick to their
existing options when they faced with a low cost of experimenting with new alternatives.
However, unbundling may have a negative impact on the discovery of new talent
because in the presence of high noise in the commercial outcomes of creative work (e.g.,
Caves 2000, Salganik, Dodds, Watts 2006), it will be challenging for firms to infer an artist’s
true talent from a one-shot unbundled experimentation result of success or failure. For
example, when an artist has the opportunity to produce an album with ten songs, a firm
will gain more information than when an artist produces a single. As the information
about a new artist’s talent from singles is noisier than the information from albums, single-
producing firmsmay bemore vulnerable to both commission errors (giving future produc-
tion opportunities to untalented artists) and omission errors (giving no future production
opportunities to talented artists) than album-only-producing firms. Omission errors are
more problematic in this situation, as talented artists that face an unlucky failure from
their single may mistakenly be considered untalented by firms and lose future production
opportunities.
Given these competing effects, I argue that the positive effect of unbundling on the dis-
covery of new talent may outweigh its negative effect in the music industry. First, in the
music industry, most firms face high costs when experimenting with a new artist (more
than one million dollars) (IFPI 2014, Benner and Waldfogel, 2016) and are entrepreneurial
firms (usually called “independent labels”) that are under financial constraints. These firms
incur a higher opportunity cost of experimentation when they produce albums only, as
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album production costs are at least 2-4 times higher than single production costs. As
shown in the labor economics literature (e.g., Tervio 2009, Pallais 2014), the high cost of
experimenting with a new artist (from an album-producing firm) may be the main reason
why they experiment with too few artists and rarely discover talent. Second, the marginal
benefit that a firm can receive from additional experimentation with one artist decreases
rapidly as the number of experimentations increases. Thus, the number of songs in an
album may be more than sufficient to evaluate the talent of the artist. The benefits from
increased experimentation owing to the decreased cost of experimentation may thus out-
weigh the loss of information quality regarding each artist’s talent level from a one-shot
unbundled experimentation.
To identify the causal effect of unbundling on the discovery of new talent, I utilize
staggered market entries of iTunes Music Store (hereafter “iTunes”) into 29 countries as
an exogenous shock. The introduction of iTunes has significantly increased the commer-
cial importance of singles because music is sold in the form of individual songs that were
previously only or primarily sold as part of albums. As iTunes increased its market share,
music firms had a larger incentive to produce their work through singles. This offers a nat-
ural experimental setting because different entry timing into many countries generated
an exogenous shock that increased firms’ incentives to produce singles; however, it was
not related to each firm’s unobserved attributes and their intention to hire new artists. I
build a novel dataset collected and matched from multiple large-scale datasets, including
the Spotify APIs and Musicbrainz. The sample covers 165,464 artists, 2,349,776 songs, and
22,157 music firms in 29 countries for the period from 1950 to 2015.
The results support the proposed theory on the impact of unbundling on experimen-
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tation and the discovery of new talent. First, a positive effect of unbundling is observed:
single-producing firms experiment with more new artists than album-only-producing
firms. Specifically, the proportion of new artists to all artists is 27.25% (a 4.62% point)
higher in single-producing firms than in album-only-producing firms. Second, single-
producing firms make more omission and commission errors. Third, single-producing
firms discover artists with greater talent and produce more popular songs; that is, the
most popular artist and song in single-producing firms are more popular than those in
album-only-producing. Finally, single-producing firms are more likely to discover artists
who created at least one new genre, suggesting that unbundling facilitates the creation of
new markets.
In addition, I conduct contingency analyses on whether the proposed mechanism that
firms under financial resource constraints may benefit more from producing singles. As
noted previously, firms that are under financial resource constraints may benefit more
from unbundling because they can experiment with more new artists when they produce
singles. In contrast, the negative impact of unbundling from high noise commonly applies
for all firms. Even firms with sufficient financial resources cannot avoid this noise. Thus,
for firms that are under financial resource constraints, the positive impact of unbundling
may outweigh its negative impact. The results indeed show that small firms, which are
more likely to be under financial resource constraints, benefit more from unbundling than
large firms.
This study contributes to two streams of strategy research. First, it contributes to the
literature on innovation and experimentation (e.g., Thomke 1998). This study focuses on
the most underexplored type of innovation - the discovery of new resources. In particular,
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this study shows that concerning human resources, experimenting with more new work-
ers (breadth-oriented search) is more beneficial than collecting more precise information
on each worker (depth-oriented search). Thus, the findings contribute to the literature on
parallel search (i.e., a type of breath-oriented search) (Nelson 1961, Posen and Levinthal
2012, Eggers and Green 2012) by providing empirical support for the benefits of breadth-
oriented search in human resource discovery.
Second, this study contributes to the strategic factor market literature. As Makadok
and Barney (2001) and Ahuja and Katila (2004) note, few studies have explored how new
valuable resources can be discovered through effective information acquisition. This study
fills this gap. In particular, this study highlights the impact of the cost of experimenta-
tion on information acquisition by shedding theoretical light on the trade-off between the
benefits of experimenting with more new artists and the benefits of producing bundled
works to gain more reliable information.
Third, this study speaks to the economics of digitalization literature by demonstrating
the impact of unbundling on supply-side issues. The impact of digitalization, a techno-
logical change, has begun to garner attention from strategy scholars (e.g., Benner and
Waldfogel 2016). By providing evidence on the impact of digitalization on an important
supply-side issue (i.e., experimentation), this study complements prior work on the role
of digitalization on the demand side (e.g., piracy, sales, or long tail) (Rob and Waldfogel
2006, Zentner 2006, Oberholzer-gee and Strumpf 2007, Elberse 2010, Zhang 2014).
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1.3 Related Literature and Model
Digitalization, unbundling, and their implications for strategic
management
Digitalization has brought forth a trend toward unbundling in many creative industries.
As transaction costs are lower in online channels, the Internet enables firms to offer indi-
vidual products that were previously only (or primarily) sold as a part of bundles (Elberse
2010). For instance, with the advent of online music stores such as iTunes, music is now
sold in the form of individual songs instead of albums with a dozen or so songs. Through
online stores, consumers can watch one episode of a television show at a time rather than
pay for an entire season on DVD. Furthermore, newspapers such as The Economist have
unbundled their online content by selling individual articles to users for a small fee, and
publishers such as McGraw-Hill have unbundled their online content by selling access to
the chapters of certain books.
Unbundling (or bundling) is one of the most important topics in the literature on in-
dustrial organization, marketing, and information systems. Most research on unbundling
has examined the impact of bundling on consumer surplus and industry sales (or profits)
(e.g., Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999, Varian 2001, Elberse 2010, Liebowitz 2016). However,
the impact of unbundling on supply-side issues, such as firm-level experimentation and
creativity (i.e., experimentingwith new artists and discovering popular and creative artists
in creative industries), has yet to be explored. While firms experimentation and creativity
are fundamental topics in the strategic management and innovation literature (e.g., March
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1991, Thomke, von Hippel, and Franke 1998, Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001, West and Iansiti
2003), asWaldfogel (2012) notes, quantitatively assessing quality or creativity is more chal-
lenging than documenting increases or reductions in sales. Indeed, whether the impact
of unbundling on experimentation is positive or negative is far from straightforward, as
unbundling affects both the costs and benefits of experimenting with new alternatives. I
discuss the impact of unbundling on the benefits and costs of experimentation in the fol-
lowing subsections.
In creative industries, the cost of experimentation is high because most creative goods
such as music are experience goods that consumers generally cannot determine whether
they like until they have used them (e.g., listened to a song or an album) repeatedly. This
creates a challenge for firms that want to predict whether new artists have the potential
to be popular (Benner and Waldfogel 2016). Industry experts refer to this feature as the
“nobody knows property.” Caves (2000) notes such difficulty in predicting the commercial
success of creative work as follows:
“A creative product is an “experience good”, but the buyer’s satisfaction
will be a subjective reaction. The producer’s intimate knowledge of the good’s
production process still leaves him in the dark about whether customers will
like it: nobody knows. … Research and pretesting are largely ineffective,
because a creative product’s success is seldom explained even ex post by the
satisfaction of some pre-existing need (Caves 2002).”
Thus, in creative industries, organizing effective experimentation is important for
firms to gain and sustain a competitive advantage over other firms. As digitalization af-
fects the cost of experimenting with new artists, exploring the impact of unbundling will
offer implications for strategic management.
In addition, more broadly, radical technological change and its impact on firms’ adap-
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tation has been an important topic in the strategic management and innovation literature
(e.g., Tushman and Anderson 1986, Henderson and Clark 1990, Christensen 1997, Tripsas
and Gavetti 2000). As digitalization, an era marked by a shift from analog to digital tech-
nology, is itself a radical technological change, examining digitalization and its impact on
firms’ adaptation will yield important implications for strategy and innovation scholars
(Benner and Waldfogel 2016). Although economists have recently begun to study digital-
ization and its impact on creative industries, the prior literature has not examined this at
the firm level, nor has it provided strategy implications for firms facing digitalization, a
technological change. Thus, this study attempts to contribute to the literature by exploring
the impact of digitalization on firms’ adaptation strategy in creative industries.
The positive effect of unbundling on creativity: Breadth-oriented
search
I review the related literature on experimentation and discuss it in the context of informa-
tion and creative industries. In these industries, winner-take-all or superstar effects are
prominent; only a small number of products or workers (in creative industries, “artists”)
dominate industry sales and profits. As creativity and popularity significantly depend
on artists’ talent, discovering new talent is critical for firms to sustain and gain competi-
tive advantages. Thus, to discover new creative or popular artists, firms must experiment
with new artists. In the strategy literature, experimentation is considered a trial-and-error
problem-solving activity (Thomke, von Hippel, and Franke 1998). It begins with the selec-
tion of one or more possible alternatives. Thus, through experimentation firms can reveal
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information on new alternatives; if one or more new alternatives outperform existing op-
tions, the new ones will replace the old. Therefore, the benefits of experimentation arise
from information on whether new alternatives have upside potential.
Such experimentation can be considered exploration in the search literature; although
firms have a tendency to stick with existing options, exploring new alternatives with up-
side potential is critical for organization learning and search (e.g. March 1991, Levinthal
and March 1993, Levinthal 1997). The problem that arises with the discovery of new al-
ternatives has been well understood by management scholars at least since Kulkarni and
Simon (1988, 1990) and March (1991). In particular, the problem is considered a trade-
off between exploration and exploitation (i.e., the trade-off between experimenting with
the new and using the old instead). Theoretically, the optimal solution to experimenta-
tion problems draws on the “bandit” literature (e.g., Denrell and March 2001, Posen and
Levinthal 2012, Lee and Puranam 2016), which shows how firms can account for the trade-
off between immediate output now and information that can help increase output in the
future. The real option literature has also explored the value of revealing information
about new alternatives (e.g., Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994). In creative industries popular,
styles often change unexpectedly. According to the real option logic, on top of the benefit
from the upside potential that firms can obtain from experimentation, investing in new
alternatives offers an additional option value for firms, particularly when firms encounter
turbulent environments.
However, to experiment with new alternatives (in my setting, new artists), firms incur
both production and opportunity costs. The production cost is high because the quality of
new artists can only be revealed on the job. Furthermore, creative goods are experience
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goods; therefore, without the introduction of creative work made by the new artists to the
market, their talent cannot be tested. The second type of cost is opportunity cost. When
a firm experiments to a greater extent with new artists, it sacrifices sales and profits from
existing options. If firms are more likely to be under more financial constraints, oppor-
tunity costs compose a larger part of the cost of experimentation. This increased cost of
experimentation may then generate a tendency for firms to stick with existing options or,
in other words, to become stuck with the local peak options (March 1991, Levinthal 1997,
Rivkin 2000).
When firms experiment with new artists through unbundled products instead of bun-
dled goods, the cost of experimenting with a new artist can be decreased. For example, in
the music industry, the cost of producing a song is much lower than the cost of produc-
ing an album, as firms need to hire more composers, lyricists, and music engineers and
Artists and Repertoire (A&R) executives need to spend more time on the artist when they
produce an album. Thus, when the information that a firm obtains from experimenting
with unbundled products remains unchanged or at least does not decrease significantly,
the relative benefit (i.e., information on new alternatives) over the cost of experiment-
ing with a new artist increases. The decreased benefit from experimenting engendered
by unbundling will be discussed in the next subsection. Thus, under a low cost of ex-
perimentation, the relative benefit over the cost of experimenting with incumbent artists
compared with new artists does not significantly increase. This leads to the conclusion
that new artists will require a larger proportion of resources in firms that produce unbun-
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dled works.¹ This logic is mathematically formulated and proven in the Model section.
Under the assumption that an artist’s talent is a random draw from any distribution,
a firm will be more likely to select better new artists when it experiments with more new
artists through unbundled products, some of which are created by artists will have high
talent. This conclusion is consistent with the real option perspective that investing in new
alternatives may offer option values for firms under uncertainty (Kogut and Kulatilaka
2001). Furthermore, this increased proportion of new artists in firms can be considered
to result from breadth-first search or breadth-oriented search. Breadth-oriented search
has been explored by prior work on parallel search, which is defined as the simultaneous
pursuit of two or more distinct alternatives. Parallel search is contrasted with a sequential
strategy, where firms fully commit to the best apparent approach and explore other pos-
sibilities only if the first proves unsuccessful (Nelson 1961, Abernathy and Rosenbloom
1969, Loch, Terwiesch, and Thomke 2001).
In particular, Nelson (1961, p. 353) emphasizes that in the parallel search strategy,
firms can benefit from information acquired by engaging in multiple alternatives simul-
taneously, rather than sequentially. As alternatives constitute different approaches to
solving the same problem, and to answering the same need, the cost of experimenting
with new alternatives is an important factor that determines the optimal number of al-
ternatives that a firm would search for simultaneously. For example, two different bomb
designs developed concurrently in theManhattan Project were used in the bombs dropped
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. More recently, in the strategy field, Loch, Terwiesch,
¹Ewens, Nanda, and Rhodes-Kropf (2015) also build a model and test this relationship in the context
of the venture capital industry. Their findings suggest that a low cost of experimentation induces firms to
invest more in new options. They call this approach a “spray and pray” strategy.
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andThomke (2001) and Posen, Matignoni, and Levinthal (2012) have theoretically explored
the benefits and costs of parallel search, and Leiponen and Helfat (2010), Eggers (2012), and
Eggers and Green (2012) have explored them empirically. The logic of the theoretical ben-
efits from parallel search is the same as the theoretical prediction in this study. The cost
of experimenting with multiple new alternatives is explored by Eggers (2012) and Eggers
and Green (2012) and is discussed in the next subsection.
The negative effect of unbundling on creativity: Decreased information
quality
In view of the quality of information perspective, unbundling has a negative impact on
the discovery of new talent. The uncertainty of creative works’ commercial success gen-
erates noise when firms experiment with new artists, and noise makes it difficult for firms
to infer new artists’ talent solely from commercial success or failure. In particular, the
fact that most information and creative goods are network goods makes it more difficult
for firms to predict the success of creative work (Arthur 1989, Varian 2001, Farrell and
Klemperer 2007). When consumers buy network goods, consumers’ choices are affected
by other consumers’ choices. Arthur (1989) argues that under the presence of network ef-
fects, insignificant events may give one product an advantage over others. Consequently,
unpredictability is amplified during product diffusion among consumers. Salganik, Dodds,
Watts (2006) offer evidence on Arthur’s theoretical argument by creating an artificial cul-
tural market and conducting experiments on this market. Their findings suggest that in-
creasing the strength of social influence increases inequality and the unpredictability of
18
success.² To sum up, the commercial success of creative work is only partly determined
by quality.
The fact that the commercial success of creative work is only partly determined by
quality makes it difficult for firms to infer talent from new artists’ success or failure. Solv-
ing the problem of choosing among alternatives to a given objective is difficult (Nelson
1961), and it is very easy to make choices which, ex post, turn out to be the wrong ones in
the presence of noise (Simon 1969, Thomke, von Hippel, Franke 1998, Denrell and March
2001). One feature that distinguishes the behavioral theory of choice from conventional
models of choice in economics is that the evaluation of searched alternatives is likely to
be imperfect (e.g., Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007, Csaszar 2012, 2013, Fang, Kim, Miliken
2014). There are two types of imperfections: firms may erroneously accept an inferior
alternative (i.e., commission error or type II error) or falsely reject a superior alternative
(i.e., omission error or type I error). Scholars have examined factors that increase or de-
crease commission errors and omission errors, and both omission and commission errors
decrease the benefit of bundling with respect to search performance.
As unbundling decreases opportunities offered to a new artist, the new artist will have
fewer opportunities to show their talent. For example, in the music industry, creative
work (i.e., a song or an album) is usually made by one singer or group. Whereas singers
has one opportunity to demonstrate their talent when producing a song, they have multi-
ple chances to demonstrate their talent when producing multiple songs for an album. The
combination of fewer chances for new artists and the considerable noise in commercial
²This is one reason why information and creative industries are described as “superstar” or “winner-
take-all” markets where blockbuster products or artists dominate sales.
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success decreases the reliability of information that firms acquire from experimentation.
Firms that produce through unbundled work may be more vulnerable to both omission
errors (giving no future production opportunities to talented artists) and commission er-
rors (giving future production opportunities to untalented artists) than bundle-producing
firms. As for omission errors, talented artists that experience an unlucky failure in their
unbundled product may mistakenly be considered untalented by firms and lose future
production opportunities. In contrast, if music firms experiment with new artists through
bundled products, those artists are given more opportunities to show their true talent
by creating and testing multiple products in bundled products. Commission errors occur
when bad alternatives may receive a lucky draw and are erroneously considered high-
performing alternatives and receive future production opportunities. Tervio (2009) argues
that there are too many mediocre incumbent artists whose talent is not sufficiently high to
justify the crowding out of novice artists with lower expected talent but with more upside
potential. This type of commission error in the allocation of future opportunities may be
one more reason for the large number of mediocre incumbent artists.
A model of unbundling and the discovery of talent
In this section, my goal is to provide a model of unbundling that can highlight how lower
costs of experimentation can alter the composition of artists and how unbundling can af-
fect the discovery of new artists. The basic setup is a multi-armed bandit problem.³ For
³There has been a considerable amount of work modeling innovation and experimentation that has used
a multi-armed bandit machine. From the classic work of Nelson (1961), Evenson and Kislev (1976), Denrell
and March (2001), Tervio (2009), and Posen and Levinthal (2012), I build on Evenson and Kislev (1976) and
Tervio (2009) by altering features of the problem to explore the effect of unbundling on experimentation and
the discovery of new talent.
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simplicity, I assume that the only parameter is the number of new artists in a firm and
that net income is in direct proportion to the top artist’s talent.⁴
I describe firms’ search process as a sequence of experiments. Talent is drawn from
a distribution with a continuous and strictly increasing cumulative distribution function.
Incumbent artists have released their songs in the past, and their talent is known to ev-
eryone. In contrast, new artists have never released their songs, and the talent of a new
artist is unknown to everyone, including herself/himself. At any period t, a firm decides
the number of new artists to maximize its expected returns. mt is the maximum talent
among all artists in the firm, nt is the number of experiments (i.e., new artists) in the firm,
which is the main choice parameter, c(nt) is the cost of experimentation and is increasing
at an increasing rate, xi is the talent quality of new artist i and is a random draw from
a distribution with positive support [xmin, xmax], f(x) is a probability density function
of xi, F (x) is the cumulative probability density function of xi, y is the largest value in
a sample of the random draws X = {x1, x2, ..., xn}, and γ is the discount factor. For
each experimentation, any firm can combine one artist with other inputs. Each experi-
mentation produces an observation on the quality of a new artist’s talent. The outcome of
experimentations is the most talented artist in their sample.⁵
I assume that the matching of individuals and firms is inconsequential. In each time
period, a firm experiments with n new artists (i.e., it makes n draws from a random dis-
tribution). The result of each experimentation is an observation xi, and the talent level
⁴The talent is skewed, and the success of a label depends on the discovery of extremely popular new
artists. For example, in the music industry, only 5% of albums or singles produced by EMI, a major music
company, broke even in 2014 (EMI, 2015).
⁵The statistical process of choosing the largest value from a set of samples is called the theory of extreme
values in the subject of order statistics (Gumbel 1958, Epstein 1960, Evenson and Kislev 1976).
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associated with the tested artist i. If the talent of the new artist is higher than mt, the
highest talent level in the firm at time t, the new artist is selected to produce songs, and
the maximum talent quality in the firm at time t+1 (mt+1) increases. The cumulative dis-
tribution ofm, the most talented artist’s talent, is F n(y) = Pr(y = max{x1, x2, ..., xn}).









n−1(y)(1 − F (y))dy is positive and decreases with n, since F n−1(y)
decreases in n. Hence, the contribution of an additional experiment decreases. As this is
a one-period model, there is no trade-off between the upside potential of experimenting
with new artists and the upfront investment.
Now, I check whether this relationship is robust to the case when firms are potentially
infinitely lived and maximize average per-period profits. More formally, a firm’s search
for creativity advances over time by discovering higher talent whenever possible. The net
present value of the firm’s profit is






Firms will choose the number of new artists nt at each time period that maximizes
V (m0). I consider the steady state. In the steady state, all firm-level variables are con-
stant over time, although individual firms’ fortunes vary over time. Let V ∗(m0) denote
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the net present value of the firm profit in the steady state (i.e., firms choose the optimal
experimentation policy). The optimized net present value can be written as a Bellman
equation as
V ∗(m) = max
n
[








m− c(nt) + γ
∫ ∞
m
V ∗(y)F n(y)dy + γV ∗(m)F n(m)
]
where m = m0. The first two terms, m − c(nt), are the profit in the current period, and
the last two terms, , are the expected benefits E(B(m,n))(= b(m,n)) from n experimen-
tations in the current period. The term γ ∫∞m V ∗(y)F n(y)dy is the additional expected
benefit from a more talented artist that a firm discovers from experimentations in the cur-
rent period, and the term γV ∗(m)F n(m) is the expected value from the most talented
artist in the current period. By taking the first derivative of these two terms and the num-
ber of new artists, I derive the following lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix 1. The
essence of this lemma is summarized in Figure 1.
Lemma 1. (Under no noise in talent discovery) The benefit from experimenting
with an additional new artist is positive and decreases with the number of new
artists.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
I assume that the cost function c(n) is an increasing function at a non-decreasing
rate with n. As Lemma 1 shows that the additional benefit of an experimentation
∆E(B(m,n)) decreases in n, there exists a unique optimal experimentation policy n∗
such that b(m,n − 1) − c(n − 1) ≤ b(m,n∗) − c(n∗) and b(m,n + 1) − c(n +







(2F n−1 − F n − F n−2)dy < ∆c(1).
I now turn to the impact of unbundling on the cost of experimentation. Let∆bu(m,n)
and ∆bb(m,n) denote the benefit function under the unbundling and bundling strategy,
respectively. Furthermore, let∆cu(n) and∆cb(n) denote the cost function under the un-
bundling and bundling strategy, respectively. If a firm adopts an unbundling strategy,
it can reveal a new artist’s talent with a small amount of cost. Using Lemma 1 and the
assumption that the cost function increases at non-decreasing rate with n, it is straight
forward that there exists a unique optimal solution n∗. Given that there exists no noise in
talent discovery, while unbundling does not change the benefit function (i.e., no change
in the marginal benefit ∆b(m,n) = ∆bu(m,n) = ∆b(m,n)), it moves the marginal cost
function downwards (∆cb(n) > ∆cu(n)). Hence, unbundling increases the optimal num-
ber of new artists n∗. As the number of incumbent artist is 1, the increased number of
new artists increases the proportion of new artists ( n∗
n∗+1 ) in firms that produce unbun-
dled work. As the number of new artists with whom firms experiment increase, firms will
discover more talent artists, meaning that m∗|t=∞ has a higher value under the optimal
experimentation policy n∗. This logic leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 2. (Under no noise in talent discovery) Firms that adopt an unbundling
strategy will increase the proportion of new artists and discover more talented
artists.
The above model does not incorporate the role of noise in talent discovery when a new
artist demonstrates talent. As I cover in the literature review section, there is considerable
noise when firms experiment with new artists. Here, I build an extended model with
noise in talent discovery. In the presence of noise, it will be more challenging for firms to
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infer the quality of an artist’s talent from her/his commercial outcome. Therefore, noise
decreases the benefit from experimentation. More formally, let e denote the noise. When
a firm experiments with a new artist through unbundled work, the noise will increase
the occurrence of omission errors. A talented artist i whose talent xi is higher than mt
may have a large negative noise term ei such that xi + ei < mt, and the firm would not
produce artist i’s work in the subsequent periods. Also the noise will increase commission
errors; an untalented artist j whose talent xj is lower than mt may encounter a large
positive noise term ej such that xj + ej > mt, and the firm produce artist j’s work in
the subsequent period(s). Thus, H(x, e) decreases with the size of e at a decreasing rate,
lime→0H(x, e) = F (x) and lime→∞H(x, e) = x−xminxmax−xmin if xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax. Let the
noise under the unbundling strategy be eu and the size of the noise under the bundling
strategy be eb and assume that eu > eb ≥ 0. As the noise e decreases the benefit of
additional experimentation, it does not change the cost of additional experimentation.
Hence, the optimal experimentation policy n∗ decreases as the noise increases. This logic
leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Ceteris paribus, as the noise of talent discovery increases, firms will
decrease the proportion of new artists and discover less talented artists.
I analyze the impact of noise on bundling choices. It will be more challenging for firms
to infer an artist’s true talent from a one-shot unbundled experimentation result of success
or failure. For example, when an artist has the opportunity to produce an album with ten
songs, a firm will gain more information than when an artist produces a single. As the
information about a new artist’s talent from singles is noisier than the information from
albums, single-producing firms may be more vulnerable to both commission errors (giv-
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ing future production opportunities to untalented artists) and omission errors (giving no
future production opportunities to talented artists) than album-only-producing firms. By
combing Lemmas, Result 1 summarizes the characteristics of the optimal experimentation
policy in the steady state.
Result 1. In the equilibrium, the impact of unbundling on experimentation and
the discovery of talent depends on the amount of noise in inferring new artists’
talent from commercial outcomes.
(i) The unbundling strategy will lead to a smaller proportion of new artists and
the discovery of less talented artists when the noise is larger than a threshold
ψ∗ such that ∫∞m ∂V ∗∂y (Hn−1(y, ψ∗) − Hn(y, ψ∗)) < ∆cu(n∗b), where n∗b is theoptimal number of experimentations under the bundling strategy.
(ii) The unbundling strategy will lead to a larger proportion of new artists and
the discovery of more talented artists otherwise.
Hence, the relationship between unbundling and experimenting with new artists is
far from straightforward. I summarize the impacts of unbundling on the discovery of new
talent in Figure 1.1 and visualize Result 1 with a numerical example in Figure 1.2. One
might believe that the lower cost of experimentation (from unbundling) may obviously
lead to a higher proportion of new artists. However, if there exists high noise from a new
artist’s commercial success, unbundling may lead to a decreased proportion of new artists.
The boundary condition is described in Result 1. The condition in the music industry
should be examined to determine whether unbundling may lead to a higher proportion
of new artists. Another interpretation of this result is that if firms face high noise in
evaluating new artists’ talent, unbundling may decrease firms’ experimentation and may
be detrimental to new artists.
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Figure 1.1: Intuition of the theoretical model on the impact of unbundling on the dis-
covery of new talent
Note: I assume that an album has twice more songs than a single does. Talent is drawn from any distri-
bution with a continuous and strictly increasing cumulative distribution function, F , with positive support
[θmin, θmax].
Figure 1.2: A numerical example of the theoretical model
Note: The talent of an artist i ((xi)) is a random draw from U(0, 1). The noise parameter e determines the
range of a uniform distribution (i.e., U(−0.5× e, 0.5× e)). Thus, the actual noise, ei is a random draw from
this uniform distribution. The lines show talent of firm’s top artist under the optimal experimentation policy
(n∗). Each point is the average of 20,000 simulations. Other functions and parameters of this numerical
example are specified in Appendix A.
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1.4 Empirical Context and Hypotheses
Empirical context: The music industry and the advent of iTunes
The music industry and the discovery of new artists
Music firms are called record labels or labels. In this study, I focus on music produc-
tion firms that coordinate production, distribution, and marketing processes. These music
production firms also scout talent and develop new artists, which is called “artists and
repertoire (A&R),” and maintain contracts with recording artists or bands. The Interna-
tional Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI 2012, p. 9) describes music as “an
investment-intensive business,” as the first major activity thatmusic production firms have
traditionally undertaken is the discovery of new artists. Indeed, music firms’ investment
in A&R and marketing in 2014 totaled more than US $4.3 billion, which accounts for more
than 10% of global music sales (IFPI 2014). According to the IFPI, at least US $500,000
is required to experiment with a new artist. Common features of contracts signed with
emerging artists include the payment of advances, recording costs, tour support, video
production and marketing and promotion costs, as shown in Table 1.1. In comparison
with music production firms, online music providers such as Spotify, iTunes, Google, or
SoundCloud spent no money on upfront investment for talent discovery. Thus, music
production firms remain the largest upfront investors in artists’ careers.
Many would-be artists seek to make their music available to consumers, for example,
by submitting “demo tapes” to music production firms. These potential music products
differ substantially in both their ex ante promise (how broadly appealing the artist would
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Table 1.1: Cost of producing a release in the music industry
Item Cost
Cash advance US $50,000 - 350,000
Recording US $150,000 - 500,000
Video production US $50,000 - 300,000
Tour support US $50,000 - 150,000
Marketing and promotion US $200,000 - 700,000
Total US $500,000 - $2,000,000
Source: International Federation of the Phonographic Industry report, 2014
be if their work was produced) and their ex post success (how successful they turn out to
be) (Benner and Waldfogel 2016). Even artists themselves do not know their own talent
(Caves 2000, Tervio 2009). For example, Elvis Presley is one of the most significant cultural
icons of the 20th century and is referred to as “the King of Rock and Roll.” Elvis himself did
not know his own talent, and he chose Sun Records, a small independent music firm in the
1950s, in the hope of being discovered. After he finished his audition at Sun Records, the
CEO SamPhillips and his secretarywrote down his name and added her own commentary:
“Good ballad singer. Hold.” Sun Records is currently referred as the music firmwhere rock
and roll was born. This example shows how difficult it is for firms to evaluate artists’ talent
ex ante.
Singles vs albums: Decline of singles in the late 20th century
A release is a broad term that covers the two different forms: singles and albums. Music
firms commonly classify a release with a small number of songs as singles and a release
with a large number of songs as albums. If a music firm produces some of its work by
a single instead of an album, the cost of production or opportunity cost of a single is
smaller than that of an album. In addition, one of my key informants from Sony Mu-
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sic Entertainment confirms that producing albums requires greater cost and commitment
than producing singles:
“Albums are much more expensive. More studio time, more writing,
more production hours, more involvement of producers, more people’s in-
put needed on an album vs. a single. It also requires far more hours in the
recording and mixing studios, more hours of mastering. It comes out to 12-15
times more expensive than singles in terms of music production costs.”
Many new artists have debuted with singles. Elvis Presley recorded five singles at
Sun Records. The discography of Aqua, a Danish-Norwegian dance-pop band, is also
a good example, as the band debuted with a single and made singles until they made an
international breakthrough with their single “Barbie Girl” in 1997. A more recent example
is the song “Cheerleader” by the Jamaican singer OMI, which was released as a single by
the independent label Oufah. The song first debuted on the Billboard Hot 100 in the United
States in early May 2014, as the song peaked in the UK.
The commercial and artistic importance of the single (as compared with the album) has
varied over time, throughout technological development, and according to the audience
of particular artists and genres. The golden age of the single was in the 1950s to early
1960s, in the early years of rock music. Starting in the mid-1960a, albums became a greater
focus andmore important as artists created albums of uniformly high quality and coherent
themes, a trend that reached its apex in the development of the concept album. Over the
1990s and early 2000s, the single generally received less attention in the United States than
albums. On the one hand, the production cost of a new medium, the compact disc (CD),
gave greater incentive to labels to produce their works by albums, because CDs required
virtually identical production and distribution costs as singles but could be sold at a higher
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price.
The advent of iTunes
Before the iTunes Store, most songs were downloaded through illegal file-sharing web-
sites, such as Napster. Steve Jobs expressed concern that people were illegally obtaining
music, as it was the only option they had. In 2002, Steve Jobs made an agreement with
the five major labels to offer their content through iTunes and, in 2003, introduced iTunes,
which provided amarket for songs and albums. This was an unexpected shock to themusic
industry. In response to the change that iTunes brought, music labels started to produce
their songs as not only albums but also singles. The iTunes music store affected the music
industry hence significantly; indeed, iTunes held approximately 90% of the online market
share in the late 2000s. For instance, on September 12, 2006, Steve Jobs announced in his
“It’s Showtime” keynote that Apple had 88% of the legal US music download market, and
on February 26, 2008, iTunes surpassed Best Buy to become the second-largest music ven-
dor in the US behind Walmart. It then became number one on April 3, 2008.
Since 2004, the service has become available in a number of countries other than the
US. Table 1.2 summarizes the history of the iTunes’ market entry into foreign countries
and shows the various timing of iTunes’ introduction across different countries. Apple
has attained considerable success in the global music market. For example, the entry of
Apple’s iTunes into Japan in August 2005 received a considerable amount of attention. On
October 10, 2012, the iTunes Store was reported to have a 64% share of the global online
music market.
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Table 1.2: History of staggered entries of iTunes into 29 sample countries
Ranking by No. of No. of Proportion
no. of unique labels label-year of label-year
Country Entry time unique labels in Musicbrainz observations observations
1 United States 28-Apr-03 1 16,916 25,238 29.64%
2 United Kingdom 15-Jun-04 2 8,914 15,977 18.76%
3 France 15-Jun-04 5 2,974 5,552 6.52%
4 Germany 15-Jun-04 3 5,398 9,890 11.61%
5 Austria 26-Oct-04 23 355 631 0.74%
6 Belgium 26-Oct-04 14 729 1,394 1.64%
7 Finland 26-Oct-04 10 1,329 2,198 2.58%
8 Greece 26-Oct-04 21 366 753 0.88%
9 Italy 26-Oct-04 6 1,919 3,187 3.74%
10 Netherlands 26-Oct-04 9 1,490 2,406 2.83%
11 Portugal 26-Oct-04 26 258 208 0.24%
12 Spain 26-Oct-04 11 1,249 1,621 1.90%
13 Canada 3-Dec-04 8 1,638 2,196 2.58%
14 Ireland 6-Jan-05 28 234 274 0.32%
15 Sweden 10-May-05 7 1,660 2,261 2.65%
16 Norway 10-May-05 16 546 901 1.06%
17 Switzerland 10-May-05 17 528 687 0.81%
18 Denmark 10-May-05 19 443 631 0.74%
19 Japan 4-Aug-05 4 3,676 3,145 3.69%
20 Australia 25-Oct-05 12 1,152 1,767 2.07%
21 New Zealand 6-Dec-05 24 307 428 0.50%
22 Mexico 4-Aug-09 29 217 240 0.28%
23 Czech Republic 29-Sep-11 25 288 469 0.55%
24 Estonia 29-Sep-11 22 359 193 0.23%
25 Poland 29-Sep-11 15 573 764 0.90%
26 Argentina 13-Dec-11 27 235 244 0.29%
27 Brazil 13-Dec-11 18 467 573 0.67%
28 Russia 4-Dec-12 13 817 1,018 1.20%
29 Turkey 4-Dec-12 20 375 316 0.37%
Total - - 55,412 85,162 100%
Note: I exclude countries which have fewer than 200 unique music production firms in the Musicbrainz
database. The final sample consists of 85,162 firm-years associated with 22,067 firms.
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Hypotheses
As shown in the literature review and theory section, there are competing effects of un-
bundling on firms’ experimentation. First, the decreased cost of experimentation will lead
to more experimentation with new artists (i.e., an increase in proportion of new artists in
firms). Second, the noise in the commercial success or failure of new artists will increase
omission and commission errors in giving future production opportunities to artists. I
initially test these predictions.
Hypothesis 1: Single-producing firms will have a larger proportion of new artists
than album-only-producing firms.
Hypothesis 2: Single-producing firms will make more omission and commission
errors in talent discovery than album-only-producing firms.
I now turn to my main hypothesis: the relationship between unbundling and the dis-
covery of new talent. First, the negative effect of unbundling from high noise commonly
applies for all firms. Even firms that have sufficient financial resources cannot avoid this
noise. However, the positive effect of unbundling depends on a firm-level variable: fi-
nancial resource constraint. The cost of experimentation comprises actual production
costs and opportunity costs. If album-producing firms are under financial resource con-
straints, the opportunity cost of experimenting with new artists will be higher than that in
single-producing firms, and the high cost of experimenting with a new artist (from album-
producing) may be the main reason why they experiment with too few artists and rarely
discover talent. Thus, for firms that are under financial resource constraints, the positive
impact of unbundling may outweigh the negative impact of unbundling. In fact, most mu-
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sic production companies are small: the average number of releases a firm produces per
year is 2.778, and the average number of songs per year is approximately 25. Asmost music
firms that are under financial resource constraints are small and entrepreneurial firms, the
positive impact of unbundling on the proportion of new artists may outweigh the negative
impact. Based on this logic, I predict that unbundling may increase, on average, the pro-
portion of new artists (among all artists in labels). As shown in the mathematical model,
the proportion of new artists is a profit-maximizing experimentation policy of a firm. If
a firm experiments with more new artists, the chance of discovering extremely popular
artists and artists who can create new-to-the-world genres (the chance of discovering an
extreme value) will increase. Thus, this logic leads to following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: Single-producing firms will discover more popular artists than
album-only-producing firms. (The popularity score of the most popular artist
will be higher in single-producing firms than in album-only-producing firms.)
Hypothesis 3b: Single-producing firms will be more likely to discover artists who
create at least one new-to-the-world genre than album-only-producing firms.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
Sample
The sample comprises all music production record labels reported on the Musicbrainz
database for the period from 1947 to 2015. The sample includes only music production
labels because other labels lack A&R executives or teams, which play a role in searching
for and recruiting new artists. I choose 29 countries that have more than 200 unique labels
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in the Musicbrainz database, and I exclude label-years in which firm i does not release
any song in year t. The final sample consists of 85,162 label-years associated with 22,197
labels; the panel is unbalanced.
Variables
Independent variables
My research question is whether labels that produce some of their works in singles
are more likely to try out and discover new talent. The first independent variable,
Dummy_Label_Singleit, is a dummy, which is equal to 1 when at least one release of
label i is released as a single in year t and 0 otherwise. An alternative measure for this
variable, the proportion of singles to all releases, is also used to check the robustness of
the results in Appendix 5. When I test the second hypothesis, the unit of analysis is an
artist. I n this test, I use a dummy variable Dummy_Artist_Singlei which takes one if
the first release of artist i is produced by a single, otherwise 0.
Dependent variables
The first key dependent variable is the proportion of new artists in a label, measured as
the ratio of new artists to all artists of label i in year t. A new artist is a singer or band
who did not release a song before year t. By using the Musicbrainz database, I count the
numbers of new artists in proportion to all artists of each label.
The next set of dependent variables measures the popularity of artists and songs for
each label-year. First, I calculate the maximum popularity of all artists for label-years. I
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obtain the popularity score of artists from the Spotify Echonest API. The Spotify Echonest
API offers a platform, which is called the Rosetta Stone, to match Spotify Echonest IDs
and Musicbrainz IDs. I use this platform to calculate firm-level maximum popularity of
artists. The range of individual artist popularity is between 0 to 1. Second, I calculate
the maximum popularity of all songs for label-years. I obtain the popularity score of
artists from the Spotify Web API, which is a distinct API from Spotify Echonest API. I
explain differences between these two APIs in Appendix 2. I use unique the international
standard recording code (ISRC) IDs for songs to match Spotify Web API and Musicbrainz
data. The range of song popularity is between 0 and 100, and I normalize the score to (0,
1) by dividing by 100.
The next dependent variable measures creativity. The Spotify Echonest API offers
genre tags for all artists. Overall, 1,347 unique genre tags exist, and each artist has more
than or equal to one genre tag(s). I code a dummy that is equal to one if label i discovers a
new artist who has a “new to the world” genre tag. For example, as shown in Table 1.3, Jimi
Hendrix has five genre tags: blues-rock, classic rock, psychedelic rock, rock, and classic
funk rock. He is the first artist who has a genre tag, classic funk rock. Track Records, an
independent label in the United Kingdom, signed with him and produced his first single
Hey Joe in 1966. The dummy variable for Track Records in 1966 is coded as one.
Also, the dummy variable for an omission error takes one if a music firm did not give
no second production opportunities to top 20% talented artists, and these artists left the
firm and produced their releases in other firms. The dummy variable for an commission
error takes one if a music firm gave more production opportunities to bottom 20% talented
artists.
36
Table 1.3: The 20 most popular artists who created at least one new genre
All genre tags that
Genre Artist Popularity the artist is related
1 Classic funk rock Jimi Hendrix 0.844746 blues-rock|classic rock|
psychedelic rock|rock|classic funk rock
2 Rap rock Three Days Grace 0.72003 post-grunge|alternative metal|
rap rock|canadian metal|rap metal|
alternative rock|pop rock|nu metal|
funk metal
3 Modern classical Philip Glass 0.718992 minimal|fourth world|modern classical|
|drone
4 Canadian country Shania Twain 0.708148 country|country dawn|canadian country|
contemporary country|pop rock
5 Operatic pop Andrea Bocelli 0.690948 operatic pop|opera|italian pop|
pop christmas
6 Progressive electro house Steve Angello 0.68801 house|edm|electro house|big room|
progressive house
7 Chillwave James Blake 0.674761 indie r&b|bass music|chillwave|
|progressive electro house|tech house
8 P funk Bootsy Collins 0.653654 classic funk rock|p funk|funk rock|funk|
soul christmas|soul
9 Metropopolis Grimes 0.649263 indie r&b|grave wave|chillwave|
metropopolis|indietronica|nu gaze
10 Indie folk Jenny Lewis 0.645795 indie folk|stomp and holler|indie pop
11 Alternative rock Bob Mould 0.638338 alternative pop|power pop|
permanent wave|jangle pop|
alternative rock
12 Girl group The Shangri-Las 0.637551 brill building pop|girl group|
13 Blues-rock Ten Years After 0.630591 blues-rock|british blues|classic rock|
psychedelic rock|modern blues|
texas blues|blues|chicago blues|rock|
electric blues|album rock|southern rock
14 Roots reggae Toots and The Maytals 0.627068 reggae|world christmas|roots reggae|ska|
15 Britpop Jarvis Cocker 0.625673 britpop|madchester|chamber pop
16 Juggalo Geto Boys 0.625638 gangster rap|juggalo|dirty south rap|rap|
old school hip hop|crunk|southern hip hop|
hardcore hip hop|g funk|hip hop
17 Hardstyle Showtek 0.618621 hardstyle
18 Acid house The Future 0.617926 electronic|illbient|big beattrip hop|
Sound of London ambient|acid house| breakbeat|
downtempo|intelligent dance music
chill-out|abstract
19 Yé-yé Françoise Hardy 0.61561 chanson|yé-yé|cabaret
Note: This table shows information about the 20 most popular artists who created at least one genre. In this
table, a genre tag is considered as a genre. Overall, 992 artists created 1,425 genres. The artists who created




I control for (1) the number of songs (lag 1 year) as a firm size proxy, (2) the mean number
of artists’ prior releases (lag 1 year) as a firm status proxy, (3) a dummy for the label’s
founding year, (4) a dummy that takes the value of one if label i produced at least one
top 5% song in the previous year, (5) country dummies, (6) genre dummies, and (7) decade
dummies. I also use these variables to match similar firms before running the main stage
regressions.
Instrumental variables
I address the potential endogeneity of producing singles by using two instrumental vari-
ables. The first instrumental variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if
iTunes was introduced in year t in country c and otherwise 0. The introduction of iTunes
increases firms’ incentive to produce singles exogenously. The second instrumental vari-
able is the country-level proportion of CDs to all releases. The CD was the main medium
of music releases in the 1980-90s. After the introduction of iTunes, CDs have been re-
placed by digital downloads. The second instrumental variable captures the continuous
change in the medium, complementing the dummy variable for iTunes’ staggered market
entries. A high proportion of CDs means that the share of digital music market is small,
resulting in a smaller incentive for firms to produce singles. Thus, the proportion of CDs
has a negative influence on the production of singles. As the introduction of iTunes and
other digital services was determined by the difference in intellectual property regimes
between US and local countries rather than differences in local countries’ talent discovery,
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these variables should be uncorrelated with factors in the error term that influence music
labels’ decision to experiment with new artists.
Figure 1.3 previews why the staggered introduction of iTunes can be a valid instru-
mental variable. Panel A shows that the decreasing production of singles rather than
albums changed to an increasing extent after the introduction of iTunes. Panel B demon-
strates that proportions of single-producing labels in the seven representative countries
increased after the introduction of iTunes. The seven countries are randomly selected by
choosing one country from each entry year (US from 2003, France from early 2004, Italy
from late 2004, the Netherlands from late 2004, Switzerland from early 2005, Japan from
late 2005, and Poland from 2011). First, the suggestive pattern in Figure 1.3 supports the
notion that the introduction of iTunes increased music firms’ incentive to produce singles
and that the proportion of single-producing music firms increased accordingly (inclusion
restriction). This is tested with multiple statistics in the results section; the test statistics
support the pattern in this figure. Second, this introduction of iTunes is not correlated
with their preference for new talent over incumbent artists (exclusion restriction).
Empirical specification
Baseline OLS models and endogeneity issues
I use OLS regressions as the baseline tests for my hypotheses to validate the impact of
whether label i produces some of its works as singles in year t with respect to the pro-
portion of new artists and popularity of artists and their songs in label i at time t. I add a
vector of control variables that might influence labels’ decision to produce singles. Thus,
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Figure 1.3: Introduction of iTunes and single-producing labels
Panel A. Proportion of single-producing labels around event time
Panel B. Seven countries’ proportion of single-producing labels around event time
Note: Figure 1.3 previews why iTunes’ staggered entries into many countries can be a valid instrumental
variable. Panel A shows that after the introduction of iTunes, the decreasing trend in producing singles
changed to an increasing trend. Panel B demonstrates that proportions of single-producing labels in the
seven representative countries increased after the introduction of iTunes. The seven countries are randomly
chosen from each entry cohort (US from 2003, France from early 2004, Italy from late 2004, Netherlands
from late 2004, Swiss from early 2005, Japan from late 2005, and Poland from 2011). This shows that the
introduction of iTunesmight have increased label’s incentive to produce singles and the proportion of single-
producing labels increased (inclusion restriction). This is tested with multiple statistics in the results section;
the test statistics support the pattern in this figure.
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my initial specification is
Dependent_V ariableit = β0 + β1Dummy_Label_Singleit + β2Xit + Ci +Git
+ Tt + eit,
Dependent_V ariablei = β0 + β1Dummy_Artist_Singlei + β2Xit + Ci +Git
+ Tt + eit,
where i indexes firms, t indicates the calendar time, Xit is a set of observable character-
istics of the firm described above as control variables, Ci is country fixed effects, Git is
genre fixed effects, and Tt is the year fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at the label
level.
Whereas equation (1) controls for correlation between producing singles and control
variables, one may still be concerned about selection based on omitted variables (Hamil-
ton and Nickerson, 2003). In an ideal experimental design, I would randomly assign single
production status and measure ex post the difference in proportion of new artists and
popularity of artists and their songs. In practice, we observe changes in both the practice
of producing singles and the proportion of new artists and popularity of artists and their
songs. In this setting, one important potential omitted variable will be a firm’s intention
to discover new talent. If a music firm desires to discover new talent more than other
music firms, it may be more likely to produce singles and to simultaneously experiment
with more new talent and subsequently discover more new talent.
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Instrumental variable estimators (2SLS)
I address this endogeneity issue by utilizing the aforementioned instrumental variables:
staggered introduction of iTunes and country-level proportion of CDs to all releases. In
iTunes, a firm must sell its products as songs as well as albums, which induces an in-
crease in single production. iTunes was introduced by Apple in different countries at
different times, where the entry timing for each country was exogenous to the music in-
dustry. By exploiting this different entry timing, I measure the impact of the introduction
of an unbundled market on the adoption of singles production. This approach also solves
the endogeneity issue partly by using an exogenous variable, which increases the incen-
tive to adopt singles production but does not necessarily affect a music firm’s intention
to try out new artists. In the first-stage regression, I estimate the following equation:
Dummy_Label_Singleit = βIVZit + µit, where Zit is a set of firm characteristics and
instrumental variables and µit is an error term. Then, I estimate the second-stage OLS
regression model:
Dependent_V ariableit = β0 + β1 ˆDummy_Label_Singleit + β2Xit + Ci +Git + Tt
+[ηit + β2(Dummy_Label_Singleit
− ˆDummy_Label_Singleit].




An ideal instrumental variable would generate firm-level variation in the incentives
to produce singles, thereby allowing me to control for market-specific trends in the dis-
covery of new talent. Unfortunately, I cannot identify any firm-level instruments, so my
identification strategy is vulnerable to omitted variables that are correlated with both my
country-level instruments and firm-level change in the discovery of new talent. However,
I expect any resulting bias to be small becausemy specification controls for time-invariant,
firm-specific factors and a number of time-varying observables at the firm level.
Matching estimators: Propensity score matching and CEM
To complement the instrumental variables analysis, I use matching estimators: propensity
score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) and coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus
et al., 2011). Matching estimators control for selection bias by creating a matched sam-
ple of treatment and control observations that are similar with respect to the observable
characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). To implement propensity score matching, I
estimate a probit of firms’ decision to produce singles and use fitted values from that model
as estimates of the propensity score. I then trim extreme values and firm-year observa-
tions off the common support of the propensity score distribution to obtain my matched
sample.
To implement CEM, continuous variables are ‘coarsened’ into splines for the purposes
of creating ‘strata’ - or discrete mutually exclusive bundles of control variables. Treatment
and control group observations are thenmatched exactlywithin each stratum, which elim-
inates the need to compare the means of the treatment and control groups after matching.
I allow for unbalanced matching within each strata, as recommended by Iacus et al. (2011).
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Then, I adjust the second-stage regressions by weighting so that the results can be inter-
preted as average treatment effects.
Sample Statistics
Table 1.4 reports descriptive statistics on all the variables for the sample at the firm-year
level. First, the descriptive statistics for the independent variable show that the propor-
tion of firm-years that produce at least one single is 31.3%. Second, I have four firm-level
dependent variables: the proportion of new artists to all artists, maximum artist popular-
ity, maximum song popularity, and a dummy variable that takes the value of one if label i
experiments with at least one new artist who created a new genre. The average proportion
of new artists is 0.428, and the standard deviation is large (0.435). The averages of max-
imum artist popularity and maximum song popularity are 0.146 and 0.021, respectively.
The variances of these variables are also large (0.189 and 0.094, respectively). As shown in
Figure 1.4, popularity distributions are highly skewed, and the skewness of the song pop-
ularity is larger than that of artist popularity. In addition, I report descriptive statistics on
the two instrumental variables. First, the proportion of firm-year observations that iTunes
was introduced in country c is 0.450; that is, 45% of firm-year observations are after the
introduction of iTunes, and the other 55% are before the introduction of iTunes. Second,
the average of the second instrumental variable, the country-level proportion of CDs to
all releases, is 0.735.
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics
Variable name Level of variation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Independent variables:
(Dummy) one if label produces at least one single Firm 0.313 0.464 0 1
(Dummy) one if the first release of artist i is produced by a single Artist 0.199 0.399 0 1
Dependent variables:
Proportion of new artists to all artists Firm 0.428 0.435 0 1
Omission error Artist 0.036 0.187 0 1
Commission error Artist 0.471 0.499 0 1
Maximum artist popularity Firm 0.146 0.189 0 0.884
Maximum song popularity Firm 0.021 0.094 0 0.880
(Dummy) one if at least one new artist created a new genre Firm 0.003 0.055 0 1
Instrumental variables:
(Dummy) one if iTunes was introduced in country c Country 0.450 0.497 0 1
County-level proportion of CDs to all releases in the previous year Country 0.735 0.057 0 0.792
Control variables:
log (Number of songs) Firm 2.15 1.517 0 6.960
log (Mean number of artists’ prior releases) Firm 0.735 0.921 0 6.339
Dummy one if label’s founding year Firm 0.246 0.431 0 1
(Dummy) one if label produced at least one top 5% song Firm 0.246 0.431 0 1
in the previous year
Herfindahl index for genre in label Firm 0.135 0.312 0 1
Other variables:
Number of songs Firm 25.491 46.132 1 1839
Number of releases (albums + singles) Firm 2.778 4.723 1 238
Number of singles Firm 0.785 2.409 0 142
Proportion of singles to releases Firm 0.212 0.372 0 1
Number of unique artists Firm 2.409 3.665 1 159
Number of new artists Firm 0.946 1.664 0 57
Number of new foreign artists Firm 0.202 0.898 0 36
Year Firm 2000.056 11.455 1950 2015
Number of label-year observations 85,162
Number of unique labels 22,157
Number of unique artists 165,464
Number of unique releases 343,156
Number of unique songs 2,349,776
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Figure 1.4: Popularity distributions
Panel A. Artist popularity distribution
Panel B. Song popularity distribution
Note: I excluded observations with popularity 0 from both distributions. Figure 1.4 shows that popularity
distributions are highly skewed. Also, it demonstrates that the label-level mean artist popularity distribution
in Panel B is more skewed than the artist popularity in Panel A.
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1.6 Results
Does producing singles increase the proportion of new artists?
I test the hypothesis that producing singles leads to increased experimentation with new
artists and increased discovery ofmore popular artists by releasingmore new artists. Table
1.5 shows the results of testing the impact of producing singles on the proportion of new
artists in firms. For this purpose, I estimate five different versions of the same equation:
OLS, firm fixed effects, propensity score weighted regression, CEM matching regression,
and instrumental variables analysis (2SLS). Column 1 reports estimates from a simple OLS
specification with control variables. I find a strong partial correlation between produc-
ing singles and the proportion of new artists. Specifically, the proportion of new artists
increases by 3.71% in firms that produce some of their work as single(s) comparison with
those that produce their work only as albums. Column 2 shows the results of the same
model after I control for firm fixed effects, which are not substantially different from the
OLS specification. Columns 3 and 4 present estimates from the same model after match-
ing to control for observable differences between single-producing firms and non-single-
producing firms. Figure 5 shows why and when matching may matter. In Panel A, the
distributions of propensity scores of single-producing firms and album-only-producing
firms are largely different before matching. Panel B demonstrates the distributions after
matching; visually there is a tighter fit between the two groups after matching. Column
3 shows results the from matching and weighting by the propensity score, and Column
4 shows results from the CEM matching model. The coefficients from these matching
models, 4.10% and 4.62%, are similar to the results from the OLS and fixed effect models.
47
Table 1.5: Does producing singles increase experimenting with new artists?
DV: Proportion of new artists in label
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fixed Propensity
OLS Effects Matching CEM 2SLS
(Dummy) one if label produces at least one single 0.0371** 0.0437** 0.0410** 0.0462** 0.2411**
(0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0060) (0.0886)
log (No. of songs) (1 year lag) 0.0024 -0.0301** -0.0293** -0.0378** -0.0377**
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0040)
log (Mean no. of artists’ prior releases) (1 year lag) -0.0643** 0.0493** 0.0330** 0.0783** 0.0498**
(0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0020)
(Dummy) one if label’s founding year 0.1888** 0.1641** 0.1733** 0.1657** 0.1474**
(0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0093) (0.0086) (0.0100)
(Dummy) one if label produced at least one top 5% song -0.0371** -0.0140 -0.0040 -0.0279* -0.0305*
in the previous year (0.0079) (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0127) (0.0135)
Herfindahl index for genre in label -0.1302** -0.1053** -0.0963** -0.1058** -0.1107**
(0.0046) (0.0053) (0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0062)
Constant 7.7354** 15.2257** 13.4111** 20.8601** 11.8820**
(0.9055) (1.1792) (1.3541) (1.5949) (1.8463)
Label fixed effect no yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effect yes omitted omitted omitted omitted
Genre fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes
2SLS first-stage summary statistics
F -statistic 51.94
T -statistic: (Dummy) one if iTunes was introduced in country c 4.70
T -statistic: Country-level proportion of CDs to all releases -12.98
in the previous year
Adjusted R2 0.0271
Adjusted R2 0.1196 0.0860 0.0699 0.1111 n.a.
N 85,162 85,162 56,087 63,101 85,162
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust and clustered
at the label level. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments are not
necessary at the 5% level (χ2(1) = 5.423 in the 2SLS specification, column (5)). The Sargan’s J-statistic
(χ2(1)) is 0.205 (p = 0.6505), alleviating concerns about an over-identification problem.
Because the decision to produce singles is endogenous, the results shown in Columns
1-4 can be interpreted only as correlations. In Column 5, I present estimates from the 2SLS
model, which controls for the potential endogeneity of producing singles by using two in-
strumental variables. The first instrumental variable is a dummy variable that is assigned
a value of one if iTunes was introduced in the country in that year, whereas the second
instrumental variable is the country-level proportion of CDs to all releases by all firms in
the previous year.
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Figure 1.5: Kernel density distribution of the probability of producing at least one sin-
gle
Panel A. Before matching
Panel B. After matching
Note: Figure 1.5 shows why matching may matter. In Panel A, the distributions of the propensity scores
before matching are quite different from the treatment group and control group (n = 85, 162). Panel B
demonstrates that the distributions of the propensity scores after matching (n = 56, 087). Visually there
exists a tighter fit between the two groups after matching. I trim 29,075 observations which are off the
common support of the propensity distribution to get the matched sample.
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For the first instrumental variable, the first-stage relationship between the introduc-
tion of iTunes and the production of singles by the firm is strongly positive: the t-statistic
on this dummy variable is 4.7. The second instrumental variable also shows a strongly
negative first-stage relationship between country-level proportion of CDs to all releases
in the previous year and the production of singles by the firm: the t-statistic on this in-
strumental variable is -12.98. Overall, the first-stage F -statistic of 51.94 indicates that the
instruments are powerful. In the second stage, the estimated change in the proportion
of new artists is positive 24.11%, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. I inter-
pret this result as evidence of a causal relationship between producing singles and greater
experimentation with new artists. Whereas the 2SLS point estimate is larger than the
matching estimate in Column 4, the difference between two coefficients is not statisti-
cally significant (at the 5% level). Collectively, the findings in Table 1.5 suggest that firms
experiment with more new artists and decrease the proportion of incumbent artists when
they produce unbundled products (singles) instead of bundled products (albums) only.
Does producing singles increase omission and commission errors?
I turn now to the second hypothesis, which tests the impact of producing singles on
omission and commission errors. Table 1.6 shows the results of tests on the impact of
producing singles on these errors. I estimate three different versions of the same equation:
OLS, logistic regression, and instrumental variables analysis (2SLS). Columns 1 and 4
report estimates from a simple OLS specification, Column 2 and 5 report estimates from
a logistic regression model. I find a strong partial correlation between producing singles
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and omission errors and did not find a strong partial correlation between producing
singles and commission errors. Specifically, omission errors increase by 29.75% when
firms experiment with new artist through a single.
Table 1.6: Does producing singles increase omission and commission errors?
DV: (Dummy) Omission error DV: (Dummy) Commission error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logit Logit
(Odds OLS (Odds
OLS ratios) 2SLS OLS ratios) 2SLS
(Dummy) one if the first release of artist i is produced by a single 0.0092* 0.2605* 0.1959* -0.0213 -0.0849 -0.2047
(0.0046) (0.1290) (0.0828) (0.0136) (0.0613) (0.1832)
log (No. of songs) (1 year lag) -0.0075** -0.1716** -0.0073* 0.0595** 0.2708** 0.0050
(0.0019) (0.0545) (0.0033) (0.0069) (0.0320) (0.0073)
log (Mean no. of artists’ prior releases) (1 year lag) -0.0017 0.0085 0.0034 -0.0098 -0.0429 0.0064
(0.0023) (0.0743) (0.0041) (0.0067) (0.0297) (0.0091)
(Dummy) one if label’s founding year -0.0242** -0.5198** -0.0272* 0.1403** 0.6409** 0.0527
(0.0066) (0.1984) (0.0131) (0.0216) (0.0987) (0.0290)
(Dummy) one if label produced at least a top 5% song -0.0210* -0.6223* -0.0286* -0.0913** -0.4218** -0.0049
(0.0096) (0.2909) (0.0127) (0.0285) (0.1285) (0.0282)
Herfindahl index for artists’ genre in label 0.0509** 1.2957** 0.0362** -0.1362** -0.5955** -0.0998**
(0.0051) (0.1284) (0.0076) (0.0142) (0.0637) (0.0167)
Constant 3.2608* 124.5912** 2.1015 -36.2690** -159.5302** -20.3040**
(1.2812) (39.0763) (1.9847) (3.5947) (15.8488) (4.3899)
Label fixed effect no no yes no no yes
Country fixed effect yes yes omitted yes yes omitted
Genre fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
2SLS first-stage summary statistics
F -statistic 38.24 38.24
T -statistic: (Dummy) one if iTunes was introduced in country c 2.16 2.16
T -statistic: Country-level proportion of CDs to all releases -8.59 -8.59
in the previous year
Adjusted R2 0.0372 0.0372
Adjusted R2 / Pseudo R2 0.0420 0.1135 n.a. 0.0978 0.0747 n.a.
N 10,850 10,850 10,850 10,850 10,850 10,850
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust and clustered
at the label level. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the instruments are not
necessary at the 5% level (χ2(1) = 4.106 in the 2SLS specification, column 3 and 6). The Sargan’s J-statistic
(χ2(1)) is 2.822 (p = 0.093), alleviating concerns about an over-identification problem.
Because the decision to produce singles is endogenous, the results shown in Columns
1-2 and 4-5 can be interpreted only as correlations. In Columns 5 and 10, I present esti-
mates from the 2SLS model, which controls for the potential endogeneity of producing
singles by using the aforementioned two instrumental variables. The first-stage relation-
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ship between the introduction of iTunes and producing singles by the firm is strongly pos-
itive: the t-statistic on this dummy variable is 2.16. The first-stage relationship between
country-level proportion of CDs to all releases in the previous year and the production
of singles by the firm is strongly negative: the t-statistic on this instrumental variable is
-8.59. Overall, the first-stage F -statistic of 38.24 indicates powerful instruments. In the
second stage, the estimated changes in the omission error are positive 0.1959 which is
statistically significant at the 5% level. On the other hand, the estimated changes in the
commission error are negative -0.2047 which is statistically insignificant at the 5% level.
Collectively, the findings in Table 6 suggest that experimenting with a new artist through
a single increases omission errors.
Does producing singles increase the popularity of artists and their
songs?
I turn now to the third hypothesis, which tests the impact of producing singles on the
experimentation performance of a firm. I am particularly interested in the popularity of
artists and songs in firms as experimentation performance variables. Table 1.7 shows the
results of tests on the impact of producing singles on these performance (or popularity)
variables. I estimate five different versions of the same equation: OLS, firm fixed effects,
propensity score weighted regression, CEM matching regression, and instrumental vari-
ables analysis (2SLS). Columns 1 and 6 report estimates from a simple OLS specification
with control variables. I find a strong partial correlation between producing singles and
the popularity of artists and songs. The range of artist popularity and song popularity vari-
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ables is from 0 to 1. Specifically, the maximum popularity of artists increases by 0.0311
in firms that produce some of their work as single(s) in comparison with those that pro-
duce their work only as albums. The maximum popularity of songs increases by 0.0263 in
firms that produce some of their work as single(s) in comparison with those that produce
their work only as albums. Next, Columns 2 and 7 show results of the same model after
I control for firm fixed effects, which show that they are not substantially different from
the OLS specification. Columns 3, 4, 8, and 9 present estimates from the same model after
I match to control for observable differences between single-producing firms and non-
single-producing firms. Columns 3 and 8 show the results from matching and weighting
by the propensity score, and Column 4 shows results from the CEM matching model. The
coefficients from these matching models, 0.0147, 0.0138, 0.0161, and 0.0109, are similar to
the results from the OLS and fixed effect models.
Because the decision to produce singles is endogenous, the results shown in Columns
1-4 and 5-9 can be interpreted only as correlations. In Columns 5 and 10, I present estimates
from the 2SLSmodel, which controls for the potential endogeneity of producing singles by
using the aforementioned two instrumental variables. The first-stage relationship between
the introduction of iTunes and producing singles by the firm is strongly positive: the t-
statistic on this dummy variable is 3.26. The first-stage relationship between country-level
proportion of CDs to all releases in the previous year and the production of singles by the
firm is strongly negative: the t-statistic on this instrumental variable is -6.47. Overall,
the first-stage F -statistic of 18.97 indicates powerful instruments. In the second stage, the
estimated changes in the maximum popularity scores are positive 0.1434 for artists and

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































evidence of a causal relationship between producing singles and discoveringmore popular
artists. Although my 2SLS estimates in Columns 5 and 10 have greater noise than the
matching estimates in Columns 4 and 8, the differences in coefficients are not statistically
significant (at the 5% confidence level). Collectively, the findings in Table 1.7 suggest that
when firms produce singles, they discover more popular artists and songs than when they
produce their work only as albums.
New artists vs. incumbent artists: Who is the source of increased
popularity?
Who is the main source of increased popularity in single-producing firms: new artists or
incumbent artists? Mymodel predicts that the benefit of producing singles that arises from
higher popularity is mainly driven by trying out more new artists rather than incumbent
artists. Table 1.8 presents tests of this hypothesis. Here, I use two dependent variables:
(1) the maximum popularity of new artists (both artist popularity and song popularity)
and (2) the maximum popularity of incumbent artists (both artist popularity and song
popularity). I use the 2SLS model to estimate the causal relationship between producing
singles and these two dependent variables. Column 1 and 2 show that producing singles
has a positive influence on the maximum popularity of new artists and their songs, with
positive effects of 0.3256 for artist popularity and 0.0645 for song popularity. In contrast,
Columns 3 and 4 demonstrate that producing singles has no statistically significant impact
on the maximum popularity of incumbent artists and their songs. In sum, these results
suggest that the benefits of single production come from new artists.
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Table 1.8: Do new artists benefit more than incumbent artists from producing singles?
DV: DV: DV: DV:
Maximum artist Maximum song Maximum artist Maximum song
popularity of popularity of popularity of popularity of
new artists new artists incumbent artists incumbent artists
in label in label in label in label
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2 SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(Dummy) one if label produces at least one single 0.3256** 0.0645** -0.1295 0.0599
(0.0705) (0.0244) (0.0669) (0.0354)
log (No. of songs) (1 year lag) -0.0140** -0.0010 0.0185** 0.0033*
(0.0026) (0.0009) (0.0024) (0.0013)
log (Mean no. of artists’ prior releases) (1 year lag) 0.0044** 0.0005 -0.0050** 0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0004)
(Dummy) one if label’s founding year -0.0197** 0.0006 0.0113* 0.0101**
(0.0058) (0.0020) (0.0055) (0.0029)
(Dummy) one if label produced at least one top 5% song -0.0248** 0.0054* 0.0155* 0.0210**
in the previous year (0.0071) (0.0025) (0.0067) (0.0036)
Herfindahl index for genre in label 0.0366** -0.0021* 0.1869** 0.0032*
(0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0028) (0.0015)
Constant 6.7250** -1.6400** 4.8529** -3.0905**
(0.9370) (0.3242) (0.8893) (0.4699)
Label fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effect omitted omitted omitted omitted
Genre fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effect yes yes yes yes
2SLS first-stage summary statistics
F -statistic 18.97 18.97 18.97 18.97
T -statistic: (Dummy) one if iTunes was introduced in country c 3.26 3.26 3.26 3.26
T -statistic: Country-level proportion of CDs to all releases -6.47 -6.47 -6.47 -6.47
in the previous year
Adjusted R2 0.0145 0.0145 0.0145 0.0145
Adjusted R2 n.a n.a. n.a n.a
N 76,158 76,158 76,158 76,158
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust and clustered
at the label level. 2SLS test statistics are the same with the statistics in Table 5 and 7.
Do small firms benefit more from producing singles?
The cost of experimentation comprises actual production costs and opportunity costs.
Firms under financial constraints have a higher opportunity cost of trying out new artists
when they produce only albums. Therefore, as small firms are more likely to be under fi-
nancial constraints, my model predicts that small firms may benefit more from producing
singles by increasing the number of experimentation with new artists. Thus, in this anal-
ysis, I am particularly interested in the coefficient on the interaction between producing
singles and firm size. A negative coefficient on this interaction term would provide evi-
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dence of larger benefits (higher popularity) for small firms, whereas a positive coefficient
would point toward larger benefits for large firms.
Table 1.9 shows the 2SLS results, where firm size is measured using the number of
songs produced by firm i in year t. Column 1 first shows the impact of the interaction
between producing singles and firm size on the proportion of new artists. The main effect
of producing singles continues to be large, positive, and strongly statistically significant
with a point estimate of 0.2818. The point estimate on the interaction term is large and
negative, -0.0387, and statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. Thus, I find that
small firms, which are more likely to be under financial constraints, are more likely to
experiment with new artists if they produce singles.
Columns 2 and 3 demonstrate the impact of interaction between producing singles and
firm size on the popularity of artists and their songs. Themain effects of producing singles
continue to be large, positive, and strongly statistically significant with point estimates
of 0.1683 for artist popularity and 0.2919 for song popularity. Furthermore, the point es-
timates on the interaction term are large and negative, -0.0115 for artist popularity and
-0.0272 for song popularity, the latter of which is statistically significant at the 1% level.
To sum up, the results suggest that small firms gain more experimentation benefits from
producing singles than large firms do. This effect is visualized in Figure 1.6.
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new artists popularity popularity
in label in label in label
(1) (2) (3)
2 SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(Dummy) one if label produces at least one single × log (No. of songs) (1 year lag) -0.0387* -0.0115 -0.0272**
(0.0193) (0.0135) (0.0100)
(Dummy) one if label produces at least one single 0.2818** 0.1683* 0.2919**
(0.0775) (0.0681) (0.0502)
log (No. of songs) (1 year lag) -0.0251** 0.0082 0.0058
(0.0080) (0.0046) (0.0034)
log (Mean no. of artists’ prior releases) (1 year lag) 0.0505** -0.0002 0.0017**
(0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0006)
(Dummy) one if label’s founding year 0.1536** 0.0033 -0.0010
(0.0099) (0.0050) (0.0037)
(Dummy) one if label produced at least one top 5% song -0.0099 0.0010 0.0094
in the previous year (0.0168) (0.0085) (0.0063)
Herfindahl index for genre in label 0.0001 -0.0026 0.0038*
(0.0059) (0.0026) (0.0019)
Constant 12.9131** 8.7393** -4.8376**
(1.0606) (0.8682) (0.6406)
Label fixed effect yes yes yes
Country fixed effect omitted omitted omitted
Genre fixed effect yes yes yes
Period fixed effect yes yes yes
2SLS first-stage summary statistics
F -statistic 51.94 18.97 18.97
T -statistic: (Dummy) one if iTunes was introduced in country c 4.70 3.26 3.26
T -statistic: Country-level proportion of CDs to all releases -12.98 -6.47 -6.47
in the previous year
Adjusted R2 0.0271 0.0145 0.0145
Adjusted R2 / Pseudo R2 n.a. n.a n.a
N 85,162 76,158 76,158
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust and clustered











































































































































































































Does producing singles facilitate the discovery of artists who create
new genres?
I now turn to the final goal of this paper, that is, to test the relationship between produc-
ing singles and creativity. Table 1.10 shows the results of tests on the impact of producing
singles on the discovery of artists who created new-to-the-world music genres. I estimate
six different versions of the same equation: OLS, logistic regression, firm fixed effects,
propensity score weighted regression, CEM matching regression, and instrumental vari-
ables analysis (2SLS). Column 1 reports estimates from a simple OLS specification with
control variables, and the results suggest a strong partial correlation between producing
singles and the discovery of new artists who created at least one new genre. Specifically,
the chance of discovering genre-creating artists increases by 0.0013 in firms that produce
some of their work as single(s) in comparison with those that produce their work only as
albums. Columns 2 and 3 show the results of a logistic regression with the same model,
Column 2 presents the results in odd ratios, and Column 3 presents the results in aver-
age marginal effects. First, the results are not substantially different from those for the
OLS specification. Second, the probability of discovering new genre-creating artists is low
(0.3%). The odd ratio results in Column 2 show that single-producing firms are 36.57%more
likely to discover new genre-creating artists than album-only-producing firms. Column 4
shows the results from a fixed effect model, which are not substantially different from the
results in Column 1-3.
Columns 5 and 6 present estimates from the same model after I match to control for
observable differences between single-producing firms and non-single-producing firms.
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Column 3 shows the results from matching and weighting by propensity score, and Col-
umn 4 shows the results from the CEM matching model. The coefficients from these
matching models, 0.0020 and 0.0015, are similar to the results from the OLS and fixed ef-
fect models. Column 7 demonstrates the results for the 2SLS specification. The estimated
change in the possibility of discovering genre-creating artists is a positive 14.95%, which
is statistically significant at the 1% level. I interpret this result as evidence of a causal
relationship between producing singles and creativity.
Table 1.10: Does producing singles facilitate the discovery of new artists who created
a new genre?
DV: (Dummy) one if at least one new artist created a new genre
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Logit Logit
(Odds (Marginal Fixed Propensity
OLS ratios) Effects) Effects Matching CEM 2SLS
(Dummy) one if label produces at least one single 0.0013* 0.3657* 0.0012* 0.0024** 0.0020* 0.0015* 0.1459**
(0.0005) (0.1708) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0153)
log (No. of songs) (1 year lag) 0.0011** 0.3277** 0.0011** 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0049**
(0.0003) (0.1011) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007)
log (Mean no. of artists’ prior releases) (1 year lag) -0.0005* -0.2018 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0009*
(0.0002) (0.1146) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
(Dummy) one if label’s founding year 0.0022* 0.4622 0.0015 0.0018 0.0029 0.0018 -0.0083**
(0.0011) (0.3357) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0019)
(Dummy) one if label produced at least a top 5% song -0.0015 -0.3725 -0.0012 -0.0029 -0.0031 -0.0003 -0.0140**
in the previous year (0.0024) (0.4448) (0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0024)
Herfindahl index for artists’ genre in label 0.0003 0.2956 0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0035**
(0.0008) (0.2131) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0010)
Constant 0.1711* -2.5099** 0.0035** 0.1154 -0.0029* -0.0615 0.6653**
(0.0803) (0.6063) (0.0002) (0.1070) (0.0014) (0.1045) (0.2349)
Label fixed effect no no no yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effect yes yes yes omitted omitted omitted omitted
Genre fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
2SLS first-stage summary statistics
F -statistic 51.94
T -statistic: (Dummy) one if iTunes was introduced in country c 4.70
T -statistic: Country-level proportion of CDs to all releases -12.98
in the previous year
Adjusted R2 0.0271
Adjusted R2 / Pseudo R2 0.0297 0.3070 0.3070 0.0117 0.0109 0.0048 n.a.
N 85,162 64,531 64,531 85,162 56,087 63,101 85,162
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust and clustered
at the label level. 2SLS test statistics are the same with the statistics in Table 5 and 7. In Column 3, average
marginal effects are reported.
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1.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper develops and tests a simple formal model that demonstrates how digitalization-
induced unbundling can alter firms’ experimentation and creativity. While simple, the
model represents an important first step toward formalizing the relationship between
technological change and firms’ experimentation behavior and creativity that lies at the
heart of the literature on organizational learning and innovation (e.g., Nelson 1961, Kulka-
rni and Simon 1988, March 1991, Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001, Posen and Levinthal 2012). I
test the model’s core prediction using data on the production of unbundled work in music
production firms. iTunes created a market for both singles (unbundled work) and albums
(bundled work), and I exploit the staggered entries of iTunes into 29 countries that offer a
natural experimental setting. I find the causal relationship between producing unbundled
work and experimentation behavior and creativity. Specifically, music production firms
that produced unbundled work in the form of singles increased their proportion of new
artists by 27.25% (a 4.62% point) relative to firms that produced only albums. Furthermore,
music production firms that produced unbundled work experienced increased popularity
of their artists by 21.3% relative to firms that produced only albums. This result is ro-
bust to the inclusion of controls for endogenous decisions on producing unbundled work,
suggesting that the technology-induced changes in bundling lead to changes in experi-
mentation and the discovery of new talent (creativity) in a predictable manner.
This paper exploits a unique empirical setting tomake a credible causal inference about
the impact of unbundling on experimentation and creativity. However, the idiosyncrasies
of themusic industry should not cloud the general applicability ofmy conceptual approach
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to a broad range of firms and industries. Indeed, starting with the seminal work of Nelson
(1961), scholars have long examined whether parallel search or experimenting with mul-
tiple options facilitates innovation. In my setting, if firms produce unbundled work, they
can simultaneously experiment with multiple new artists, suggesting that producing un-
bundled work leads to parallel search. In particular, my model highlights that the cost of
experimentation has beenmissing from the characterization of heterogeneous experimen-
tation and the discovery of new resources, such as new technologies, assets, or workers.
Although I do not claim that my model is universal to all industries, the findings of Eggers
(2012), Eggers and Green (2012) and Posen et al. (2012) hint at its broad applicability to
settings outside the music industry.
In addition, although I identify conditions under which producing unbundled work
leads to increased experimentation with new artists and creativity and show that my par-
ticular empirical context fits well with these conditions, I have little to say about the ori-
gins of heterogeneous artist talent. I treat each artist’s talent as an exogenous endowment,
akin to a gift. Extending the model to endogenize artist talent, skill, style, or knowledge
gained as the outcome of a learning process would perhaps be an interesting extension of
my model, but that is beyond the scope of this work.
Methodologically, this study highlights the opportunities inherent in exploiting stag-
gered iTunes’ entry into 29 countries to identify the causal effects of organizational strate-
gies. Empirical research in strategy is increasingly concerned with identification (Hamil-
ton and Nickerson 2003), and localized industries offer tremendous potential for generat-
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Appendix 1. Proof of Lemma 1 and functions and parameters for Figure 2
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume no noise in talent discovery (i.e., the talent of an artist revealed
with an experimentation is a true value of the artist), an arbitrary distribution F (y) on
artists’ talent, the incremental benefit from an additional experimentation can be written
as follows.




















V ∗(y){nf(y)F n−1(y)− (n− 1)f(y)F n−2(y)}
+γV ∗(m)(F n(m)− F n−1(m))
Let u denote F n−1(y)−F n(y) and v denote V ∗(y). By integrating by parts, the equation












(F n−1(y)− F n(y))dz ≥ 0,
because ∂V ∗(y)/∂y > 0 and F n−1(y) − F n(y). Therefore, the benefit of an additional
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experimentation has a positive value under no noise in talent discovery. Now, I turn to
the change in ∆b(n) with the number of experimentations n.

















{(F n−1(y)− F n(y))
−(F n−2(y)− F n(y)}dz ≤ 0,
because 0 ≤ F (y) ≤ 1 implies F n−1(y) − F n(y) ≤ F n−2(y) − F n−1(y). Therefore, the
incremental benefit from an additional experimentation decreases.
Functional forms and parameters in the numerical example of Result 1 in Figure 2. The
cost of experimenting with a new artist by a single song is 0.002 and cost of experimenting
with a new artist by an album is 0.01. There are 10 songs in an album. To calculate the
optimal experimentation policy n∗, I run 20,000 simulations and calculate an average over
these simulations. The distribution of talent of artists F (y) is a uniform distribution with
the range [0, 1] (a well-known characteristic of the uniform distribution is F n = n/(n +
1).). The noise parameter e determines the range of a uniform distribution (i.e., ei ∼
U(−0.5 × e, 0.5 × e)). Thus, the actual noise, ei is a random draw from this uniform
distribution. Thus, for each single, a firm observes a performance of an artists which is
the sum of true talent of artist i (xi ∼ U(0, 1)) and a noise term ei ∼ U(−0.5×e, 0.5×e).
If the observed performance of an artist is larger than the existing top talented artist, the
firm will replace the existing top artist with the new artist. When a firm experiments with
new artists by albums, the firm observes the average of 10 draws of the sum of the true
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talent of artist i (xi ∼ U(0, 1)) and a noise term ei ∼ U(−0.5× e, 0.5× e); therefore, the
observed performance under album-producing is more accurate than that under single-
producing. The discount factor γ is 1 (i.e., no time discount).
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Appendix 2. Description on Databases
1. Musicbrainz Database
The MusicBrainz Database is developed with the PostgreSQL relational database en-
gine and offers all of MusicBrainz’s music metadata. This data includes information about
artists, release groups, releases, recordings, works, and labels, as well as themany relation-
ships between them as shown in Figure A2.1. The database also contains a full history of all
the changes that the MusicBrainz community has made to the data (Musicbrainz, 2016).
The first strength of Musicbrainz database is its large coverage. The second strength is
that it has information on labels; Spotify APIs do not offer the label information on their
databases (Highfield, 2007).
MusicBrainz is a project that aims to create an open content music database.
Originally, MusicBrainz started as a database for software applications to search audio
compact disc data on the Internet. MusicBrainz has expanded its scope to offer more
data beyond a compact disc metadata storehouse to be an open online database for music
(Wikipedia, 2018).
2. Spotify Echo Nest API
The Echo Nest is a music data platform company for software developers and media-
related firms. The company is located in Somerville, MA.TheEchoNest started its business
as a spin-off company from the MIT Media Lab to analyze the audio and textual content
of recorded music (Zax 2011). Its creators intended it to perform music identification,
recommendation, playlist creation, audio fingerprinting, and analysis for consumers and
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Figure A2.1. Schema of Musicbrainz database
Source: Musicbrainz webpage (https://musicbrainz.org/doc/MusicBrainz_Database/Schema).
developers. On March 6, 2014 Spotify announced that they had acquired The Echo Nest.
Spotify shut down the Echo Nest API on May 31, 2016 and developers was encouraged to
use the Spotify Echo Nest API which integrate the original Echo Nest API instead.
The Echo Nest offered their automatically-derived database of data about 30 million
songs aggregated from web crawling, data mining, and digital signal processing tech-
niques. The strength of the database is that by using multiple sources such as web crawl-
ing, data mining, and digital signal processing, they measure popularity of artists. This is
derived from many sources, including play counts, mentions on the web, mentions in mu-
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sic blogs, music reviews, Twitter, Facebook, and the catalogue of streaming applications.
The Echo Nest offered two popularity measures: familiarity and hotness. I choose fa-
Figure A2.2. Two popularity measures and their relation
Source: Music Machinery (https://musicmachinery.com/2009/12/09/a-rising-star-or/).
miliarity as my popularity measure because it measures the life-time popularity of artists.
Specifically, familiarity measures how well known in an artist is. One can understand
familiarity as the likelihood that any person selected at random will have heard of the
artist. Beatles have a familiarity close to 1, while a band like ‘Hot Rod Shopping Cart’ has
a familiarity close to zero. On the other hand, hotness corresponds to how much buzz the
artist is getting right now. Figure A2.1 shows the results. The x-axis is familiarity, and the
y-axis is hotness. Clearly, there is a correlation between hotness and familiarity. Familiar
artists are more likely to be hotter than non-familiar artists. At artists at the top right are
artists who hit the top list of the Billboard chart such as Taylor Swift, while artists at the
bottom left are artists who one has never heard of such as Mystery Fluid. This plot shows
artists as well as the popular artists whose popularity has been declining. Outlier artists
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at the left and above the main diagonal part are the artists on the rise (Music Machinery,
2009).
The Echo Nest also identify artist genre and offer genre tags for all artists in the
database. There are 1,347 unique genre tags in the database. Figure A2.3 visualize the re-
lationship among genres. If many artists have two common genres, there a link between
these genres.
Figure A2.3. Map of genres - a part of the map
Source: The Echo Nest Lab (http://static.echonest.com/playlist/moms/).
The last strength of the Echo Nest is that it offers an ID matching scheme for many
different databases. One of the problems faced by music researchers is the issue of ID
translation. The Echo Nest eliminated some of the trouble with mapping IDs with Project
Rosetta Stone. Rosetta Stone is to allow a researcher to use any music id from any music
API with the Echo Nest web services. I use this matching scheme to merge multiple
databases.
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3. Spotify Web API
In June 2014, Spotify released a new Web API that allowed third-party developers to
integrate Spotify content in their own applications (Spotify, 2014). The Spotify Web API is
a web service that can be accessed by programs through the Hypertext Transfer Protocol.
It returns data about albums, artists, tracks, playlists and other Spotify resources in JSON
format. I use song popularity data. The popularity of a track is calculated with the data
on (1) the total number of plays and (2) how recent those plays are (Spotify, 2014). I
extract song popularity data with the International Standard Recording Code code and
match with Musicbrainz and Echo Nest data.
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Appendix 3. First stage regression results
DV:(Dummy) one if label DV:(Dummy) one if the
produces at least one single first release of artist i




(Dummy) one if iTunes was introduced in country c 0.0235** 0.0202** 0.0072*
(0.0050) (0.0061) (0.0033)
Country-level proportion of CDs to all releases in the previous year -0.4791** -0.4383** -0.8098**
(0.0369) (0.0682) (0.0943)
log (No. of songs) (1 year lag) 0.0387** 0.0341** -0.0154
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0046)
log (Mean no. of artists’ prior releases) (1 year lag) -0.0027 -0.0044* -0.0030
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0057)
(Dummy) one if label’s founding year 0.0856** 0.0721** 0.0611**
(0.0056) (0.0060) (0.0171)
(Dummy) one if label produced at least a top 5% song 0.0829** 0.0758** -0.0038
in the previous year (0.0095) (0.0102) (0.0178)
Herfindahl index for artists’ genre in label 0.0277** 0.0263** 0.0018
(0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0105)
Constant 13.4295** 12.2003** 3.3929
(1.1031) (1.3825) (3.3541)
Label fixed effect yes yes yes
Country fixed effect omitted omitted omitted
Genre fixed effect yes yes yes
Period fixed effect yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.1492 0.0166 0.0348
N 85,162 76,158 13,902
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Column 1 shows the results from the first
stage regression in Table 5, and Column 2 shows that the results from the first stage regression in Table 7.
The reason why the number of observations is smaller in Table 6 is that the observations before 1985 are
excluded because there are too many missing values for popularity scores. before 1985. Column 3 shows
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 5. Alternative measure for the independent variable:
proportion of singles to all releases in label
DV: Proportion of DV: Maximum artist DV: Maximum song
new artists in label popularity in label popularity in label
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(Dummy) one if label produces at least one single 0.0696** 0.2132** 0.0155** 0.1978* 0.0166** 0.0716
(0.0046) (0.0769) (0.0019) (0.0788) (0.0012) (0.0483)
log (No. of songs) (1 year lag) 0.0060* -0.0324** 0.0214** 0.0046** 0.0141** 0.0045**
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0010)
log (Mean no. of artists’ prior releases) (1 year lag) -0.0643** 0.0499** 0.0133** -0.0003 0.0064** 0.0006
(0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005)
(Dummy) one if label’s founding year 0.1941** 0.1543** 0.0295** -0.0018 0.0335** 0.0121**
(0.0071) (0.0082) (0.0025) (0.0053) (0.0027) (0.0032)
(Dummy) one if label produced at least one top 5% song -0.0385** -0.0211 0.0163** -0.0036 0.2236** 0.0129**
in the previous year (0.0080) (0.0118) (0.0050) (0.0058) (0.0125) (0.0035)
Herfindahl index for genre in label -0.1298** -0.1031** 0.2453** 0.2197** 0.0028 0.0051**
(0.0046) (0.0056) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0013)
Constant 7.2463** 12.6653** 11.5891** 6.6617** -0.8557** -3.0922**
(0.9079) (1.5965) (0.4091) (0.8272) (0.2109) (0.5065)
Label fixed effect no yes no yes no yes
Country fixed effect yes omitted yes omitted yes omitted
Genre fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
2SLS first-stage summary statistics
F -statistic 51.94 18.97 18.97
T -statistic: (Dummy) one if iTunes was introduced in country c 4.70 3.26 3.26
T -statistic: Country-level proportion of CDs to all releases -12.98 -6.47 -6.47
in the previous year
Adjusted R2 0.0271 0.0145 0.0145
Adjusted R2 0.1215 n.a. 0.4759 n.a. 0.2221 n.a.
N 85,162 85,162 76,158 76,158 76,158 76,158
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust and clustered
at the label level. 2SLS test statistics are the same with the statistics in Table 5 and 7.
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Chapter 2
Does Digitalization Facilitate Entrepreneurial firms’ Discovery
of New Talent? The Impact of iTunes and YouTube on the
Recorded Music Industry
2.1 Abstract
Does digitalization facilitate the discovery of new talent by entrepreneurial firms? One
theoretical argument suggests that entrepreneurial firms may benefit from digitalization
because it offers diverse niche opportunities from a long-tail market and decreases the
cost of experimenting with new artists. Another theoretical argument challenges this sim-
ple positive relationship by arguing that an adverse impact may result from the fact that
would-be artists can demonstrate their talent through many services, such as YouTube or
social media, in the digital age. As incumbent firms also observe these would-be artists
who have obvious talent, the advantage of entrepreneurial firms’ discovery of new tal-
ent may be undermined. By utilizing iTunes’ and YouTube’s staggered market entries
into 29 countries, this study produces results from a difference-in-difference-in-differences
(DDD) specification. The findings suggest that iTunes and YouTube did not facilitate en-
trepreneurial firms’ discovery of new talent but decreased the average and maximum pop-
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ularity of new artists in entrepreneurial firms. In contrast, entrepreneurial firms increase
their reliance on incumbent artists. In short, the average popularity of new artists in
entrepreneurial labels decreased by at least 26% and reached a level similar to the av-
erage popularity of new artists in incumbent labels. Considering that entrepreneurial
firms have relied more on the discovery of new talent (their proportion of new artists is
approximately 20% higher than that in incumbent labels), the discovery performance of
entrepreneurial labels was lower than that of incumbent labels.
2.2 Introduction
The competitive dynamics between entrepreneurial and incumbent firms is a critical topic
in Schumpeterian competition literature (Schumpeter 1934). Technological changes shape
this competition dynamics, and many studies have examined the role of technological
change in shaping the competitive dynamics between entrepreneurial and incumbent
firms (e.g., Tripsas and Gavetti 2000, Tushman and Anderson 1986). Digitalization is a
radical technological change, and many studies in information systems, marketing, and
economics have examined how digitalization has shaped industry environments, such as
the long-tail phenomenon and unbundling (e.g., Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999, Elberse and
Oberholzer-Gee 2007). However, relatively little attention has been devoted to the com-
petition between entrepreneurial and incumbent firms in the field of strategy. This study
aims to contribute to strategy literature by exploring whether or not digitalization offers
a competitive advantage to entrepreneurial firms.
Entrepreneurial firms often generate creative destruction by experimenting with new
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products, technologies or strategies (Schumpeter 1934). As the empirical setting of this
study is the recorded music industry, where discovering new superstars plays an essen-
tial role not only in making profits but also in creating industry fashions or norms (Caves
2000), this study will focus on the impact of digitalization on the discovery of new talent
in the setting of the music industry.
Does digitalization create a more favorable competitive environment for en-
trepreneurial firms? The answer is far from straightforward because there exist both
positive and negative impacts of digitalization on entrepreneurial firms. More obviously,
digitalization has played an essential role in increasing the demand for niche products, in
creating a “long tail” in the cultural market (Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Smith 2010a). This long
tail may have created new business opportunities for potential entrepreneurs. AlsoIn ad-
dition, digitalization has dramatically decreased the cost of experimentation by lowering
production, distribution, and promotion costs. Therefore, even though the entrepreneurial
firm has fewer resources and a lower reputation than incumbent labels, they may exper-
iment with a risky, distant, and novel forms of cultural product in the presence of the
digitized market and supply chain (Benner and Waldfogel 2016). These entrepreneurial
firms’ experimentations often include experimenting with new artists, which will lead to
the discovery of better new talent.
On the other hand, there exists a negative impact on the entrepreneurial firms’ discov-
ery of new talent. Prior to digitalization, many would-be artists had more channels, such
as YouTube or SoundCloud, to demonstrate their talent even before making a deal with
music labels. In addition, the hiring process in the music industry was usually through
an offline channel, including submitting a “demo” or arranging an audition with a music
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producer. Thus, the diffusion of information about the talent of new artists was limited.
Today, in the presence of many social media in the digital age, many would-be artists
have more channels to demonstrate their talent. However, in the digital age, both en-
trepreneurial and incumbent firms are exposed to similar information through multiple
social media and web-services. In hiring a would-be artist who is already popular, incum-
bents may have an advantage because they have more useful resources and a reputation.
In fact, most YouTube music stars, who had become popular before they signed with mu-
sic labels, usually make deals with incumbent labels with a better reputation and more
plentiful resources than entrepreneurial labels. Therefore, as this liability of newness in-
creases in the digital age, digitalization may have a negative impact on the discovery of
new talent by entrepreneurial firms.
The empirical setting of this study is the recorded music industry, which may be one
of the most visible examples of industries impacted by digitalization. This study excludes
the major labels (Universal, Sony, Warner, and their subsidiaries) because these major
labels have a disproportionately large amount of resources and are less likely to rely on
the discovery of new talent; their primary business model is hiring popular incumbent
artists to utilize their network. In contrast, independent labels play an important role in
discovering new talent. Most entrants (entrepreneurial firms) in the 1990s and 2000s are
independent labels (Benner and Waldfogel 2016). Therefore, the comparable set of en-
trepreneurial firms will be independent labels. Some independent labels were reasonably
successful in discovering new talent, and these independent labels made a profit by pro-
ducing more releases with new popular artists or being acquired by the major labels.
This study utilizes the stagger market entries of iTunes and YouTube to estimate the
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causal impact of digitalization on the discovery of new talent by entrepreneurial labels.
The estimates from a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) specification suggest
that iTunes and YouTube did not facilitate entrepreneurial firms’ discovery of new tal-
ent but decreased the average and maximum popularity of new artists in entrepreneurial
firms. In contrast, entrepreneurial firms increase their reliance on incumbent artists. In
sum, the average popularity of new artists in entrepreneurial labels decreased by at least
26%, and it reached a level similar to the average popularity of new artists in incumbent
labels. Considering that entrepreneurial firms have relied on the discovery of new talent
regarding the proportion of new artists (their proportion of new artists is approximately
20% higher than that of incumbent labels), the discovery performance of entrepreneurial
labels became lower than that of incumbent labels.
In addition, iTunes and YouTube have increased the popularity of incumbent artists
in entrepreneurial labels; thus, the gap between entrepreneurial and incumbent labels has
narrowed, but the popularity of incumbent artists in incumbent labels is still 54.29% higher
than that of entrepreneurial labels. This finding suggests that digitalization weakened the
relative performance of entrepreneurial labels compared to incumbent labels.
This study offers two main contributions to strategy literature. First, it provides the
first empirical evidence linking digitalization and the competitive dynamics between en-
trepreneurial and incumbent firms. This study shows that digitalization differentially im-
pacts the discovery strategy of entrepreneurial firms versus incumbent firms, suggesting
that digitalization weakened the competitive advantages of entrepreneurial firms. Sec-
ond, this study also makes a significant methodological contribution. Many studies on
how incumbent firms respond to technological changes have depended on case stud-
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ies of only a few organizations (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000, Benner 2010, Henderson and
Clark 1990). While these studies provide rich, in-depth insights into the dynamics of in-
cumbent firms faced with technological change, their research produced little causal evi-
dence (Benner and Waldfogel 2016). Methodologically, this study used a large-scale sam-
ple with a causally identified relationship between technological change and firm strat-
egy/performance to make a significant empirical contribution to strategy research.
2.3 Setting and Related Literature
Is digitalization good or bad for entrepreneurial firms? As there exist two competing ef-
fects of digitalization on entrepreneurial firms’ discovery of new talent, it is difficult to
conclude whether digitalization is good or bad. First, the positive impact arises from the
fact that digitalization creates a long-tail market where more diverse products can be con-
sumed compared to the market prior to digitalization, and the fact that the cost of exper-
imentation (music production cost, distribution cost) is lower than before digitalization.
Second, the negative impact arises from the fact that talented artists who are yet to be dis-
covered are in a more advantageous position than prior to digitalization, as talented artists
have more channels through which to let many labels know about their talent before they
are discovered, or even to commercialize their songs themselves. When entrepreneurial
labels and incumbent labels compete against each other over new artists with obvious tal-
ent or popularity, incumbent labels have an advantage over entrepreneurial labels because
of their reputation and resources. In the following subsections, I review the theoretical ar-
guments and empirical findings that support these two competing effects of digitalization
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on entrepreneurial firms’ relative advantage in discovering new talent.
Positive impact of digitalization on entrepreneurial firms
Digitalization has also enabled the distribution of products available to customers. Even
before the expression “The Long Tail” was coined by Anderson (2006), many Internet
companies had successfully implemented digital strategies based on the long-tail concept
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2010a). For example, whereas Walmart only carries a small number
of music releases (top 3,000) with a broad appeal, due to limited shelf space and local de-
mand, online music providers such as iTunes can profitably carry niche singles and albums
with limited appeal since the cost of listing an additional single or album is close to zero,
and online music providers can aggregate demand by finding niche audiences across the
country (Zhang, 2016). The long-tail argument suggests that a new niche content, such as
remote genres, and music from new artists, can find an audience and earn similar profits
close to a “hit” single or album (Anderson 2006). The long-tail effect of digitalization has
been documented in other products such as book sales (Brynjolfsson et al. 2010a, Brynjolf-
sson, Hu and Smith 2010b, Brynjolfsson, Hu and Simester 2011), home video sales (Elberse
and Oberholzer-Gee 2007), and music consumption (Bhattacharjee et al. 2007, Dewan and
Ramaprasad 2012). Missing from the debate, however, is the link between the firms’ re-
sponses to digitalization.
Moreover, the cost of experimenting with a new artist has declined because digitaliza-
tion has lowered the cost of searching for new artists and producing, promoting, and dis-
tributing their releases. Aguiar and Waldfogel (2016) noted that these cost reductions are
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substantial enough to have enabled growth in the number of new products, and the num-
ber of new music products released each year has increased since 1990 and more rapidly
since 2000 (Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf 2010, Handke 2012, Waldfogel 2013). This decline
in the cost of experimentation may facilitate projects that labels can take on in terms of
what has traditionally been the costly and risky “discovery” of “new-to-the-world” artists,
instead of hiring incumbent artists to produce one more release (Benner and Waldfo-
gel 2016). Chang (2017) shows that music labels decrease the cost of experimentation
by producing their releases by singles, which requires fewer resources, and these single-
producing music labels tend to increase the proportion of new artists. Entrepreneurial
firms tend to be under financial constraints; thus, entrepreneurial firms may benefit from
the low cost of experimentation by facilitating their experimentation and discovery of
new talent.
Negative impact of digitalization on entrepreneurial firms
Vogel (2007) noted that unless an artist is a superstar, he or she has no bargaining power
in making deals with music labels. Digitalization has given more power to new artists
by enabling them to advertise themselves even before they sign with music labels. Some
of them upload their demo to YouTube or SoundCloud, become popular and are dubbed
YouTube Stars or YouTube Millionaires (McAlone, 2017). This phenomenon is not limited
to YouTube or SoundCloud, as social media are also useful tools for unsigned artists to
advertise and commercialize their work (Next Big Sound, 2013). Even though there exist
many channels through which to make money, unsigned artists want deals with music
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labels (Resnikoff, 2014).
Entrepreneurial firms tend to have the liability of newness because they lack resources
and reputation. When talented unsigned artists can signal talent through YouTube or
social media, entrepreneurial firms may find it difficult to make deals with these talented
new artists because incumbent labels with more resources and a better reputation can
also offer deals to these talented new artists. For example, unsigned artists who become
popular through YouTube or a similar channel tend to sign with incumbent labels (either
independent labels or major labels) that can offer more favorable terms than those of
entrepreneurial firms. It is well known that Justin Bieber was discovered on YouTube
(Benner and Waldfogel 2016, Widdicombe, 2012).
2.4 Empirical Strategy
Sample
The sample comprises all record labels reported on the MusicBrainz database for the pe-
riod between 1996 and 2015. The sample includes only record labels before and after iTunes
and YouTube were introduced in its country.
The criteria are the same as in the first chapter except for the sample period. I choose
29 countries that have more than 200 unique labels because the treatment in this study
is a country-level shock. This study excludes major labels from our sample by using the
same criteria as Thomson (2009) and Benner and Waldfogel (2016). In addition, the sam-
ple includes only record production labels since other label types lack A&R (Artists and
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Repertoire) staffs that play an important role in searching and recruiting new artists. The




The research question is whether entrepreneurial firms are more likely to rely on the dis-
covery of new talent as opposed to incumbent artists. The first explanatory variable is
an interaction between the two variables; the first dummy variable is NEWFIRMit,
which captures whether a firm began its business in year t, and the second variable is
ITUNEStc, which captures whether iTunes was in service in year t in country c. The
second explanatory variable is an interaction between the two variables; the first dummy
variable is NEWFIRMit, and the second variable is Y OUTUBEtc, which captures
whether YouTube was in service in year t in country c.
Dependent variables
The first set of dependent variables measures the popularity of artists and songs form
each label-year: POPNEWit and POPINCUMit. The next set of dependent variables
measures the popularity of artists for each label-year. First, I calculate the average and
maximum popularity of new artists and incumbent artists respectively for label-years. I
obtain the popularity score (familiarity score) of artists from the Spotify Echonest API.The
Spotify Echonest API offers a platform, called Rosetta Stone, tomatch Spotify Echonest IDs
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and MusicBrainz IDs. I use this platform to calculate the firm-level maximum popularity
of artists. The range of individual artist popularity is between 0 and 1.
The next set of dependent variables measures each label’s experimentations. I use (1)
number of artists, (2) number of releases, and (3) proportion of new artists who had never
before released a song.
Control variables
I control for variables: (1) the dummy equals 1 if label i produces at least one single re-
lease(s) in year t, (2) the number of songs as a firm size proxy, (3) the mean number of
artists’ prior releases as a firm status proxy, (4) the Herfindahl index for genre in label in
year t, (5) country dummies, (6) genre dummies, and (7) year dummies.
Empirical specification
This study estimates the change in the popularity of new artists and incumbent artists
in new firms after the introduction of iTunes and YouTube. As I utilize staggered en-
tering of iTunes and YouTube into 29 countries, this study uses difference-in-difference-
in-differences estimators by including two dependent variables (new artists popular-
ity POPNEWit, incumbent artists popularity POPINCit), control variables Xit, firm
fixed effect Fi, country fixed effects Cc, genre fixed effects Git, and year fixed effect Yt
along with the explanatory variablesNEWFIRMit×ITUNEStc andNEWFIRMit×
Y OUTUBEtc, as in
POPNEWit = α + βxXit + βNI(NEWFIRMit × ITUNESct)
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+βNY (NEWFIRMit × Y OUTUBEct) + βNNEWFIRMit
+βIITUNESct + βY Y OUTUBEct + Fi + Cc +Git + Yt + eit,
POPINCit = α + βxXit + βNI(NEWFIRMit × ITUNESct)
+βNY (NEWFIRMit × Y OUTUBEct) + βNNEWFIRMit
+βIITUNESct + βY Y OUTUBEct + Fi + Cc +Git + Yt + eit.
The total effect of iTunes on entrepreneurial firms is as βNI+βI , and the total effect of
the iTunes on incumbent firms as βI . The coefficient βNI measures how the effect varies
with label type. The coefficient βN measures the direct effect of being an entrepreneurial
firm. In the case where the dependent variable is the popularity of the new, the conjecture
is that entrepreneurial labels rely less on new artists, implying that the coefficient βNI in
the equation should be negative.
In the case where the dependent variable is the popularity of artists, the first difference
compares the popularity of new artists (and incumbent artists) that labels hire before and
after the introduction of iTunes and YouTube separately for entrepreneurial labels (treat-
ment group) and incumbent labels (control group). This yields two differences, one for the
control group and one for the treatment groups. The second difference takes the difference
between these two differences. The result is an estimate of the effect of iTunes on the pop-
ularity of artists in entrepreneurial labels and incumbent labels. The interaction terms in
equations (1) and (2),NEWFIRMit×ITUNEStc andNEWFIRMit×Y OUTUBEtc,
estimate third differences, namely, whether the iTunes effect (or the YouTube effect) is dif-
ferent for entrepreneurial labels and incumbent labels. Importantly, the staggered market
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entries of iTunes (or YouTube) into 29 countries implies that the control group is not re-
stricted to labels in countries where iTunes has never been introduced. The control group
includes all labels in countries where iTunes (or YouTube) was not in service by time t.
Thus, it includes labels in countries where iTunes (or YouTube) has never been introduced,
as well as labels in countries where iTunes (or YouTube) was introduced after time t.
Sample statistics
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics on all the variables for the sample at the firm-year
level. First, the descriptive statistics for the independent variable show that the propor-
tion of firm-years when iTunes was in service is 60.4%, and the proportion of firm-years
when YouTube was in service is 44.2%. In addition, the proportion of firm-years that were
new (entrepreneurial) labels is 22.8%, and the proportion of firm-years that produced pop
genre music is 6.3%.
Second, I have seven firm-level dependent variables. The first set of variables is about
the firm-level popularity of new and incumbent artists; there are four variables: the aver-
age popularity of new artists, maximum popularity of new artists, average popularity of
incumbent artists, and maximum popularity of incumbent artists. The averages of firm-
level average and maximum popularity of new artists are 0.023 and 0.03, respectively; they
have large standard deviations that are about three times larger than average values. The
averages of firm-level average and maximum popularity of incumbent artists are higher
than those of new artists; they are 0.023 and 0.03, respectively; they have large standard
deviations that are approximately 1.5 times larger than average values. Additionally, pop-
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Variable name Level of variation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Independent variables:
Dummy one if iTunes was in service Country 0.604 0.489 0 1
Dummy one if YouTube was in service in country c Country 0.442 0.497 0 1
Dummy one if label was a new firm in country c Firm 0.228 0.42 0 1
Dummy one if label produced pop genre music in year t Firm 0.063 0.243 0 1
Dependent variables:
Average popularity of new artists Firm 0.023 0.081 0 0.841
Maximum popularity of new artists Firm 0.03 0.099 0 0.841
Average popularity of incumbent artists Firm 0.081 0.136 0 0.880
Maximum popularity of incumbent artists Firm 0.115 0.177 0 0.880
Number of artists Firm 2.349 3.463 1 159
Number of releases (singles + albums) Firm 2.686 4.501 1 238
Proportion of new artists to all artists Firm 0.406 0.432 0 1
Control variables:
Number of tracks that label produced in year t Firm 25.386 45.277 1 1839
Average # of prior releases that label’s artists produced Firm 5.582 17.544 0 664
Herfindahl index for genre in label in year t Firm 0.129 0.305 0 1
Dummy on if label produced at least one single in year t Firm 0.28 0.449 0 1
Other variables:
Year Firm 2005.383 5.111 1996 2015
Number of label-year observations 64,471
Number of unique labels 22,265
Number of unique artists 151,441
Number of unique releases 173,181
Number of unique songs 1,636,682
ularity distributions are highly skewed. The average number of artists per year is 2.349,
and the average number of releases per year is 2.686, which is slightly larger than the av-
erage number of artists per year. These two variables show that the average size of the
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music label is quite small. The average proportion of new artists is 40.6% (0.406), and the
standard deviation is large and has a similar size (0.432).
Third, there are four control variables. The first control variable is the number of tracks
produced per firm-year, and the average value is 25.386. The second control variable is the
average number of prior releases that each label’s artists produced. The average value is
5.582. Considering that 40% of artists are new, incumbent artists had ten prior releases
on average; this shows that the industry comprises new artists with the potential to be
popular and incumbent artists with proven records; most new artists do not have a second
chance in the music industry.
2.5 Results
Did iTunes and YouTube facilitate the discovery of new talent?
I test the hypothesis that iTunes and YouTube facilitated entrepreneurial labels’ discovery
of new talent. Table 2.2 shows the results of testing the impact of iTunes and YouTube
on entrepreneurial firms’ relative reliance on the discovery of new talent compared to in-
cumbent artists.
I estimate two different versions of the popularity of new artists: the average andmax-
imum popularities. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates from DD specifications with the
two dependent variables: the average popularity of new artists and the maximum popu-
larity of new artists. Columns 1 and 2 show the average effect of the introduction of iTunes
and YouTube on the average and maximum popularities of new artists across all labels.
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The coefficients on the iTunes dummy are -0.0027 and -0.0032; although the coefficients
have negative values, these coefficients are not significant at the 5% level. The coeffi-
cients on the YouTube dummy are -0.0044 and -0.0053, implying that YouTube decreases
the popularity of new artists on average. Given that the average and maximum popularity
of new artists in labels are 0.023 and 0.03, respectively, the change from YouTube implies
decreases in average popularity of 19.13% and maximum popularity of 17.66%. Overall,
although iTunes’ impact was not significant, the negative values of the four coefficients
suggest that music labels are less likely to rely on the discovery of new talent.
The coefficients of the dummy for new (entrepreneurial) labels in Columns 1 and 2
are positive and significant at the 1% level (0.0091 and 0.0052 respectively), suggesting that
entrepreneurial labels are more likely to rely on the discovery of new talent. In addition,
the coefficients of the dummy for pop producing labels in Columns 1 and 2 (0.0220 and
0.0325 respectively) show that pop labels’ new artists are much more popular than other
genre labels.
Next, I estimate two different versions of the popularity for incumbent artists: the
average and maximum popularities. Columns 3 and 4 report the estimates from DD spec-
ifications with the two dependent variables: the average and maximum popularities of
incumbent artists. Columns 1 and 2 show the average effect of the introduction of iTunes
and YouTube on the average and maximum popularities of incumbent artists across all
labels. All four coefficients for the dummy for iTunes and the dummy for YouTube are not
significant at the 5% level. The impacts of iTunes and YouTube on the average popularity
of incumbent artists in Column 3 are negative, but the impacts of iTunes and YouTube on
the maximum popularity of incumbent artists in Column 4 are negative. Overall, there is
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no clear impact of iTunes and YouTube on labels’ reliance on incumbent artists.
The coefficients of the dummy for new (entrepreneurial) labels in Columns 1 and 2 are
positive and significant at the 1% level (-0.0192 and -0.0249 respectively), suggesting that
entrepreneurial labels are less likely to rely on the discovery of new talent. Moreover, the
coefficients of the dummy for pop producing labels in Columns 3 and 4 (0.0581 and 0.0915
respectively) show that pop labels’ new artists are much more popular than other genre
labels; this result is consistent with the findings in Columns 1 and 2.
Table 2.2: Did iTunes and YouTube facilitate music labels’ discovery of new talent?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Maximum Average Maximum
popularity of popularity of popularity of popularity of
new new incumbent incumbent
artists artists artists artists
OLS OLS OLS OLS
D-in-D D-in-D D-in-D D-in-D
Dummy one if iTunes was in service -0.0027 -0.0032 -0.0017 0.0002
(0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0036)
Dummy one if YouTube was in service -0.0044** -0.0053** -0.0006 0.0008
(0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0030)
Dummy one if label was a new firm in year t 0.0091** 0.0052** -0.0192** -0.0249**
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0017)
Dummy one if label produced pop genre music in year t 0.0220** 0.0325** 0.0581** 0.0915**
(0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0039)
Number of tracks that label produced in year t -0.0000** 0.0001** -0.0002** 0.0005**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Average # of prior releases that label’s artists produced -0.0002** -0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0004**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Herfindahl index for genre in label in year t 0.0268** 0.0297** 0.1244** 0.1683**
(0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0031)
Constant 0.0587** 0.0797** 0.0578** 0.0555**
(0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0043)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Genre fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.4111 0.4170 0.6080 0.6759
N 64,471 64,471 64,471 64,471
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. +p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust and
clustered at the label level.
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Did iTunes and YouTube facilitate the discovery of new talent by
entrepreneurial firms?
I turn now to the impact of iTunes and YouTube on entrepreneurial firms’ discovery per-
formance. Here, I test the hypothesis with a DDD specification. Table 2.3 estimates the
impacts of iTunes and YouTube and their interactions with the dummy for entrepreneurial
firms.
Columns 1 and 2 report the results of whether the impact of iTunes and YouTube on
the popularity of new artists is different for entrepreneurial and incumbent labels. First,
the interaction term between the dummy for entrepreneurial firms and the dummy for
iTunes has coefficients of -0.0115 for average popularity, which is significant at the 0.01
level, and -0.0079 for the maximum popularity, which is significant at the 0.01 level, im-
plying that the decrease in the popularity of new artists came from entrepreneurial labels.
The entrepreneurial labels are less likely to discover more popular new artists after the
introduction of iTunes. For the magnitude of the effect, the decreases in the average and
maximum popularity of new artists in entrepreneurial firms are substantial; they are 50%
and 26.33% of the average values, respectively. Figure 2.1 shows the dynamic effect of
iTunes on the discovery of new talent by entrepreneurial firms compared to incumbent
firms.
Second, the interaction term between the dummy for entrepreneurial firms and the
dummy for YouTube has coefficients of -0.0030 for average popularity, which is signifi-
cant at the 0.1 level, and 0.0003 for maximum popularity, which is not significant. En-
trepreneurial labels are less likely to discover more popular new artists after the intro-
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Table 2.3: Did iTunes and YouTube facilitate entrepreneurial music labels’ discovery
of new talent?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Maximum Average Maximum
popularity of popularity of popularity of popularity of
new new incumbent incumbent
artists artists artists artists
OLS OLS OLS OLS
D-in-D-in-D D-in-D-in-D D-in-D-in-D D-in-D-in-D
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0115** -0.0079** 0.0099** 0.0113**
× Dummy one if iTunes was in service (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0038)
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0030+ 0.0003 0.0184** 0.0169**
× Dummy one if YouTube was in service (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0035)
Dummy one if iTunes was in service -0.0013 -0.0023 -0.0030 -0.0012
(0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0037)
Dummy one if YouTube was in service -0.0043** -0.0054** -0.0021 -0.0006
(0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0031)
Dummy one if label was a new firm 0.0151** 0.0087** -0.0285** -0.0345**
(0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0026)
Dummy one if label produced pop genre music in year t 0.0221** 0.0325** 0.0579** 0.0914**
(0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0033) (0.0039)
Number of tracks that label produced in year t -0.0000** 0.0001** -0.0002** 0.0005**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Average # of prior releases that label’s artists produced -0.0002** -0.0002** 0.0003** 0.0004**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Herfindahl index for genre in label in year t 0.0268** 0.0296** 0.1244** 0.1684**
(0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0031)
Constant 0.0572** 0.0788** 0.0600** 0.0577**
(0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0043)
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Genre fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.4116 0.4171 0.6086 0.6763
N 64,471 64,471 64,471 64,471
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. +p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust and
clustered at the label level.
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duction of YouTube in terms of the average popularity of new artists. For the magnitude
of the effect, the decreases in the average and maximum popularity of new artists in en-
trepreneurial firms are smaller than the decrease resulting from iTunes; they are 13.04%
of average values. Figure 2.2 shows the dynamic effect of YouTube on the discovery of
new talent by entrepreneurial firms compared to incumbent firms. In sum, the results in
Columns 1 and 2 suggest that iTunes and YouTube weakened entrepreneurial labels’ dis-
covery of new artists compared to incumbent labels.
Figure 2.1: Dynamic Impact of iTunes on the Discovery of New Talent by En-
trepreneurial Firms
Note: Figure 2.1 plots estimated year by year pre- and post-iTunes in the discovery of new talent from
OLS regressions with fixed effects and controls. Each point represents the estimated difference between the
treated group (entrepreneurial firms after the introduction of iTunes) and control group (incumbent firms
after the introduction of iTunes) in each year.
Columns 3 and 4 report the results of whether the impact of iTunes and YouTube on
the popularity of incumbent artists is different for entrepreneurial and incumbent labels.
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Figure 2.2: Dynamic Impact of YouTube on the Discovery of New Talent by En-
trepreneurial Firms
Note: Figure 2.2 plots estimated year by year pre- and post-YouTube in the discovery of new talent from
OLS regressions with fixed effects and controls. Each point represents the estimated difference between the
treated group (entrepreneurial firms after the introduction of YouTube) and control group (incumbent firms
after the introduction of YouTube) in each year.
First, the interaction term between the dummy for entrepreneurial firms and the dummy
for iTunes has coefficients of 0.0099 for average popularity, which is significant at the 0.01
level, and 0.0113 for the maximum popularity, which is also significant at the 0.01 level.
Considering that the impact of iTunes on overall labels’ incumbent popularity was not
significant, the relative increase in the popularity of incumbent artists in entrepreneurial
labels means a relative decrease in the popularity of incumbent artists in incumbent la-
bels. Entrepreneurial labels are more likely to rely onmore popular incumbent artists after
the introduction of iTunes. For the magnitude of the effect, the decreases in the average
and maximum popularity of new artists in entrepreneurial firms are substantial; they are
12.23% and 9.83% of average values, respectively.
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Second, the interaction term between the dummy for entrepreneurial firms and the
dummy for YouTube has coefficients of 0.0184 for average popularity, which is significant
at the 0.01 level, and 0.0169 for maximum popularity, which is significant at 0.01. En-
trepreneurial labels are more likely to rely on more popular incumbent artists after the
introduction of YouTube in terms of the average and maximum popularity of incumbent
artists. For the magnitude of the effect, the increases in the average and maximum popu-
larity of incumbent artists in entrepreneurial firms are more substantial than the decrease
resulting from iTunes; they are 22.71% and 14.70% of average values, respectively. In sum,
the results in Columns 3 and 4 suggest that iTunes and YouTube make entrepreneurial
labels rely more on incumbent artists than on incumbent labels.
Are all entrepreneurial firms and genres equally affected?
Table 2.4 explores whether the negative impact on entrepreneurial labels differs based on
genre. I test the previous results across different genres: the pop genre vs. non-pop gen-
res. Columns 1 to 4 report results on a subsample of pop-genre music producing labels,
while Columns 5 to 8 report results on the other subsample of non-pop-genre music pro-
ducing labels.
In a subsample of pop-genre music producing labels in Columns 1 and 2, the pre-
viously negative and significant coefficients for the iTunes and YouTube dummies turn
non-significant. In Columns 3 and 4, the previously positive and significant coefficients
of the iTunes dummy turn non-significant, but the previously positive and significant








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































producing labels are much more likely to rely on incumbent artists after the introduction
of YouTube. In the other subsample of non-pop-genre music producing labels in Columns
5 to 8, the results are very similar to the previous results, but the magnitude of the negative
impact of iTunes and YouTube on entrepreneurial labels’ discovery of new artists becomes
larger and the coefficients become more significant. The magnitude of entrepreneurial la-
bels’ popularity of incumbent artists is almost identical to previous results. This suggests
that the previous negative results of entrepreneurial labels’ discovery of new artistsmainly
come from non-pop-genre music labels.
Are all entrepreneurial firms and genres equally affected?
We consider the decrease in the popularity of new artists in entrepreneurial labels
as a decrease in their discovery of new artists. Can the decrease in the popularity of
new artists in entrepreneurial labels be a decrease in discovery performance or smaller
investment in new artists?
An alternative explanation would be that iTunes and YouTube facilitated the founding
of more entrepreneurial labels (which are more open to new artists), or entrepreneurial
labels lowered their bar for new artists and experimented with more new artists. The
lower popularity for new artists may have come from this increased experimentation.
If this is true, more new entrepreneurial firms would be founded or experimentations
would be facilitated. Table 2.5 explores whether iTunes and YouTube facilitated firm
founding and experimentations. Columns 1 and 2 show that iTunes and YouTube did not
facilitate firm founding. Column 1 shows the results from an OLS model, and Column 2
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shows the results from a logistic regression model. Here, the dependent variable is the
dummy if label i is a new firm in year t. The coefficients of the dummies for iTunes are
0.0084 and 0.0375, but none of these coefficients are significant. The coefficients of the
dummies for YouTube are 0.0004 and 0.0106, but none of these coefficients are significant.
Columns 3 to 5 explore whether iTunes and YouTube facilitated experimentations in
the music industry. Each column has a different measure for experimentation: number
of artists, number of releases, and proportion of new artists. In Columns 3 to 5, the
coefficients of the dummy for iTunes are negative but not significant, and the coefficients
of the dummy for YouTube are also negative but not significant. In Column 5, the
coefficient of the dummy for new firms is 0.1901, which is significant at the 1% level,
implying that entrepreneurial labels were more open to new artists.
Columns 6 to 8 examine whether iTunes and YouTube facilitated entrepreneurial
labels’ experimentations. The coefficients of the dummies for iTunes and YouTube remain
negative and non-significant. However, the coefficients of the interaction between the
dummy for new labels and the dummy for YouTube are -0.2488 and -0.2984, which are
negative and significant at the 1% level, implying that YouTube decreased entrepreneurial
firms’ experimentations in terms of the number of artists and releases. However, the
proportion of new artists in entrepreneurial labels did not change after the introduction
of iTunes and YouTube compared to that in incumbent labels.
In sum, the results in Table 2.5 offer evidence that refutes the alternative explanation
that the decrease in the popularity of new artists in entrepreneurial labels may stem from













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The empirical findings thus far illustrate that the introduction of iTunes and YouTube
changed entrepreneurial labels’ discovery strategies and performance as opposed to those
of incumbent labels. How does digitalization affect the discovery of new talent by en-
trepreneurial firms? Theoretical research challenges the intuitive positive relationship;
the negative impact from the increased advantage of would-be artists with visible talent
may outweigh the positive impact from a long-tail market and decreased cost of experi-
mentation.
The results confirm that the negative impact of digitalization would overshadow
the positive impact of digitalization. The estimates from a difference-in-difference-
in-differences specification suggest that iTunes and YouTube did not facilitate en-
trepreneurial firms’ discovery of new talent but decreased the average and maximum
popularity of new artists in entrepreneurial firms. In contrast, entrepreneurial firms in-
crease their reliance on incumbent artists. In sum, the average popularity of new artists
in entrepreneurial labels decreased by at least 26% and reached a similar level of the aver-
age popularity of new artists in incumbent labels. Considering that entrepreneurial firms
have relied on the discovery of new talent in terms of the proportion of new artists (their
proportion of new artists is approximately 20% higher than that in incumbent labels), the
discovery performance of entrepreneurial labels became lower than incumbent labels.
In addition, iTunes and YouTube increased the popularity of incumbent artists in en-
trepreneurial labels; thus, the gap between entrepreneurial and incumbent labels has nar-
rowed, but the popularity of incumbent artists in incumbent labels is 54.29% higher than
107
that of entrepreneurial labels. This suggests that digitalization weakened the relative per-
formance of entrepreneurial labels compared to incumbent labels.
I note an important limitation to these findings. This study does not use sales and
cost data. Thus, using popularity data only, we cannot confirm that the change in the dis-
covery of new talent in entrepreneurial firms increased sales or profits. Therefore, future
work may analyze the impact of digitalization on entrepreneurial firms’ sales by merging
another dataset, such as the Nielsen Soundscan database.
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Appendix 2.1 Did iTunes facilitate music entrepreneurial firms’ discovery of new
talent over time?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Maximum Average Maximum
popularity of popularity of popularity of popularity of
new new incumbent incumbent
artists artists artists artists
OLS OLS OLS OLS
D-in-D-in-D D-in-D-in-D D-in-D-in-D D-in-D-in-D
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0058+ -0.0023 -0.0039 -0.0036
× Dummy one if iTunes started its service in the same year (year 0) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0049) (0.0056)
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0066* 0.0000 0.0028 0.0041
× Dummy one if iTunes started its service in the previous year (year 1) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0056)
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0066* 0.0023 0.0081+ 0.0060
× Dummy one if iTunes started its service two year ago (year 2) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0047) (0.0055)
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0059+ 0.0039 0.0147** 0.0144**
× Dummy one if iTunes started its service three year ago (year 3) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0053)
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0076* 0.0017 0.0154** 0.0192**
× Dummy one if iTunes started its service four year ago (year 4) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0047) (0.0054)
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0076* 0.0023 0.0227** 0.0273**
× Dummy one if iTunes started its service five year ago (year 5) (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0050) (0.0057)
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0071* 0.0026 0.0214** 0.0259**
× Dummy one if iTunes started its service six year ago (year 6) (0.0036) (0.0042) (0.0053) (0.0062)
Dummy one if label was a new firm 0.0106** 0.0044** -0.0384** -0.0562**
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0022)
Dummy one if iTunes started its service in the same year (year 0) 0.0031 0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0010
(0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0045)
Dummy one if iTunes started its service in the previous year (year 1) 0.0022 0.0017 0.0019 0.0025
(0.0035) (0.0042) (0.0053) (0.0061)
Dummy one if iTunes started its service two year ago (year 2) -0.0007 -0.0020 0.0051 0.0097
(0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0064) (0.0074)
Dummy one if iTunes started its service three year ago (year 3) -0.0036 -0.0054 0.0024 0.0058
(0.0050) (0.0059) (0.0074) (0.0085)
Dummy one if iTunes started its service four year ago (year 4) -0.0051 -0.0065 0.0003 0.0018
(0.0055) (0.0066) (0.0082) (0.0095)
Dummy one if iTunes started its service five year ago (year 5) -0.0089 -0.0113 0.0002 0.0011
(0.0061) (0.0072) (0.0090) (0.0105)
Dummy one if iTunes started its service six year ago (year 6) -0.0140* -0.0167* 0.0050 0.0075
(0.0067) (0.0079) (0.0099) (0.0115)
Control variables:
Dummy on if label produced at least one single 0.0089** 0.0160** 0.0000 0.0235**
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0015)
Number of tracks that label produced in the same year -0.0000 0.0002** -0.0003** 0.0007**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Average # of prior releases that label’s artists produced -0.0003** -0.0003** 0.0004** 0.0005**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Herfindahl index for genre in label in the same year 0.0380** 0.0415** 0.1670** 0.2124**
(0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0022)
Constant 0.0378** 0.0501** 0.0543** 0.0396*
(0.0094) (0.0111) (0.0139) (0.0161)
Genre fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.1420 0.1766 0.2967 0.4355
N 47,117 47,117 47,117 47,117
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. +p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust and
clustered at the label level.
111
Appendix 2.2
Did YouTube facilitatemusic entrepreneurial firms’ discovery of new talent over time?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Maximum Average Maximum
popularity of popularity of popularity of popularity of
new new incumbent incumbent
artists artists artists artists
OLS OLS OLS OLS
D-in-D-in-D D-in-D-in-D D-in-D-in-D D-in-D-in-D
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0002 0.0056+ 0.0112* 0.0075
× Dummy one if YouTube started its service in the same year (year 0) (0.0025) (0.0030) (0.0044) (0.0051)
Dummy one if label was a new firm 0.0014 0.0066* 0.0087+ 0.0107*
× Dummy one if YouTube started its service in the previous year (year 1) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0052)
Dummy one if label was a new firm 0.0002 0.0060+ 0.0126** 0.0171**
× Dummy one if YouTube started its service two year ago (year 2) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0045) (0.0052)
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0012 0.0049 0.0216** 0.0255**
× Dummy one if YouTube started its service three year ago (year 3) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0048) (0.0056)
Dummy one if label was a new firm 0.0009 0.0077* 0.0198** 0.0247**
× Dummy one if YouTube started its service four year ago (year 4) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0055) (0.0065)
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0010 0.0050 0.0177** 0.0200**
× Dummy one if YouTube started its service five year ago (year 5) (0.0033) (0.0039) (0.0058) (0.0067)
Dummy one if label was a new firm -0.0005 0.0060 0.0199** 0.0252**
× Dummy one if YouTube started its service six year ago (year 6) (0.0039) (0.0046) (0.0068) (0.0079)
Dummy one if label was a new firm 0.0021* -0.0018 -0.0331** -0.0499**
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0020)
Dummy one if YouTube started its service in the same year (year 0) -0.0060** -0.0085** -0.0009 0.0016
(0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0035) (0.0041)
Dummy one if YouTube started its service in the previous year (year 1) -0.0064** -0.0087** -0.0018 -0.0026
(0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0044)
Dummy one if YouTube started its service two year ago (year 2) -0.0088** -0.0115** -0.0046 -0.0057
(0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0055)
Dummy one if YouTube started its service three year ago (year 3) -0.0117** -0.0152** -0.0023 -0.0032
(0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0060)
Dummy one if YouTube started its service four year ago (year 4) -0.0152** -0.0189** -0.0054 -0.0050
(0.0034) (0.0041) (0.0060) (0.0069)
Dummy one if YouTube started its service five year ago (year 5) -0.0177** -0.0213** 0.0024 0.0051
(0.0038) (0.0045) (0.0066) (0.0076)
Dummy one if YouTube started its service six year ago (year 6) -0.0214** -0.0261** -0.0048 -0.0039
(0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0075) (0.0087)
Dummy on if label produced at least one single 0.0035** 0.0069** -0.0037** 0.0199**
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0014)
Number of tracks that label produced in the same year -0.0000 0.0001** -0.0003** 0.0006**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Average # of prior releases that label’s artists produced -0.0002** -0.0002** 0.0005** 0.0006**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Herfindahl index for genre in label in the same year 0.0258** 0.0273** 0.1779** 0.2321**
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0023)
Constant 0.0441** 0.0571** 0.0491** 0.0323**
(0.0062) (0.0073) (0.0107) (0.0125)
Genre fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Country fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effect yes yes yes yes
Adjusted R2 0.1315 0.1610 0.3199 0.4641
N 46,200 46,200 46,200 46,200
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. +p < 0.1,∗ p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust and
clustered at the label level.
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Chapter 3
Does Foreign Ownership Weaken the Discovery of New Talent
from the Host Country? Evidence from Sony’s Acquisition of
CBS Records
3.1 Abstract
Does foreign ownership or capital undermine the discovery of new domestic talent in the
cultural industry? One theoretical argument suggests that foreign ownershipmayweaken
the discovery of new talent from the host country because foreign owners may lack a good
understanding of the host country culture (“liability of foreignness”). Another theoretical
argument challenges this simple negative relationship by arguing that foreign ownership
may have an offsetting advantage that can be transferred from the home country to a
foreign subsidiary at a cost that outweighs the liability of foreignness. This study focuses
on the case of Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records (a US major label) in 1988, which is
the first merger by a Japanese firm with a firm of a distant culture. The estimates from
a difference-in-differences (DD) specification suggest that Sony did not undermine CBS
Records’ discovery of domestic new talent but rather increased the popularity of new
domestic artists in CBS Records and its sublabels by 44.48%. In contrast, Sony’s acquisition
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decreased CBS Records’ reliance on incumbent artists and foreign (outside the US) artists.
Finally, I also conduct the same analysis with nine other major mergers and compare the
results with the results from Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records. The results are consistent
with the results from Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records.
3.2 Introduction
Does foreign ownership or capital weaken the discovery of new domestic talent? As for-
eign owners’ culture and language are different from the domestic ones, many practi-
tioners express concern about foreign owners’ acquisitions of cultural companies. For
example, in the 1980s, the Japanese economy was growing, and Japanese companies often
performed better than did US companies. In the 1980s, many Japanese companies started to
acquire US companies in the cultural industry. One of the most successful Japanese firms
in the 1980s, Sony, acquired CBS Records, one of the major music labels in the United
States. Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records was one of the most visible examples in this
trend. Industry experts worried about the invasion of Japanese capital into American cul-
ture as follows.
“With the announcement of Sony’s purchase of CBS Records, some in
the record industry lamented the selling of a part of American culture to the
Japanese. ”We’re obviously very disappointed that a great American record
company with a very strong history in the business has been sold to a foreign
company,” a Warner’s executive told The Wall Street Journal. One columnist
wrote of the Japanese, ”They make good cars, TV sets, tractors. But will they,
or the executives they hire, know another Duke Ellington when they hear
one?” ‘’ (New York Times, 18 Sep 1988)
Can foreign owners of firms understand overseas countries’ culture and improve the
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discovery of new talent from the host country? The answer is far from clear because there
exist both positive and negative impacts of foreign ownership on the discovery of new
talent from the host country. This is related to the standard economic reasoning for for-
eign direct investment, which relies on two factors that were well-documented by Stephen
Hymer 50 years ago (Hymer 1960, Chang, Kogut, and Yang 2016). The first factor is that
a firm, when it ventures outside its national market, faces a disadvantage that subsequent
literature has coined as the “liability of foreignness” (Zaheer, 1995). Thus, foreign owners
may struggle with the liability of foreignness. In the setting of the music industry, it is
plausible that foreign owners and the executives they hire may miss artists who would
become stars because the foreign owners may not be able to understand the culture of the
host country to the fullest.
On the other hand, a positive impact of foreign ownershipmay result from the fact that
the firm must have an offsetting advantage that can be transferred from the home country
to the foreign subsidiaries at a cost that does not overshadow the benefits of the competi-
tive advantage (Chang et al. 2016). There is considerable empirical research that supports
the existence of offsetting competitive advantages (e.g., Caves 1971, Caves 1996, Morck and
Yeung 1991, Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997). In emerging economies’ cross-border M&As ,
the acquiring firms tend to have access to more capital and better management. This ad-
vantage may not only offset the liability of foreignness but also overshadow the negative
impact of the liability of foreignness. In this setting, the acquiring companies often have
better financial resources and management systems; Sony was one of the most innovative
and successful firms in the 1980s.
The empirical setting of this study is the music record industry, which is perhaps the
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most visible example of industries impacted by cross-border mergers. This research fo-
cuses on the case of Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records in 1988, which was the first merger
by a Japanese firm with a firm of a distant culture . Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records
offers a novel setting to measure the impact of Sony’s purchase on the discovery of new
talent in CBS Records and its sublabels. The estimates from a difference-in-differences
(DD) specification suggest that Sony did not weaken CBS Records’ discovery of new tal-
ent but rather increased the popularity of new artists in CBS Records and its sublabels
by 84.19%. In contrast, Sony’s acquisition decreased CBS Records’ reliance on incumbent
artists; the popularity of incumbent artists CBS Records had hired decreased by 49.78%.
Additionally, there is no evidence that Sony reduced the popularity of domestic artists
and the proportion of domestic artists in CBS Records. The additional analyses show that
the increase in the popularity of new artists in CBS Records resulted from the spike in
the popularity of domestic new artists in CBS Records. The results from the release level
analysis are consistent with these findings.
Finally, I also conduct the same analysis with nine other merger cases and compare
the results with the results from Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records. The results from these
mergers seem to be consistent with the results from Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records.
This study offers two main contributions to strategy literature. First, this study pro-
vides the first empirical evidence on the relation between cross-border merger and per-
formance in the cultural industry, which tends to be of a local nature. This research shows
that although there are concerns about the negative impact of foreign ownership on the
discovery of new talent from the host country, the acquiring company can overcome the
liability of foreignness by bringing its own competitive advantage. Second, this study also
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makes a significant methodological contribution. Much of the work on how cultural firms
respond to ownership change has depended on case studies of a few organizations. While
these studies provide rich, in-depth insights into the performance of companies acquired
by foreign owners, their research produces little causal evidence. Methodologically, this
study analyzes a large-scale sample with a causally identified relationship between foreign
ownership and firms’ discovery performance in the cultural industry, making a significant
empirical contribution to strategy research.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the
relevant literature. Section 4 provides the empirical strategy, data, and sample statistics.
Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
3.3 Literature Review
The persistent performance differences across firms within industries is pervasive, and
searching for sources of such performance differences is one of the fundamental issues in
strategy. One salient example of the performance differences is that multinational sub-
sidiaries face a competitive disadvantage compared with local firms. Although the most
prevalent form of multinational entry mode is acquisition (89 percent of foreign direct in-
vestment in developed countries was through acquisitions – Barba Navaretti and Venables
2006), rather than through greenfield investment, prior research has focused on greenfield
investment (Guadalupe, Kuzmina, and Thomas 2012). This study focuses on foreign di-
rect investment through acquisition. Little research has examined whether the relative
performance of firms acquired by multinational corporations over local firms increases or
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decreases and the extent to which newly acquired subsidiaries increase or decrease their
discovery performance in a culturally embedded industry – the music industry.
Theoretical arguments suggest that foreign ownership can have both positive and neg-
ative effects on the discovery of new talent from the host country. The argument predict-
ing a negative impact of foreign ownership relies upon the liability of foreignness.
Liability of Foreignness
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the question, ‘is there a liability of foreignness in
the discovery of new talent in the music industry?’ Scholars in global strategy have long
theorized that multinational corporations doing business in foreign countries encounter
costs coming from the unfamiliarity of the environment, among other factors (Zaheer
1995, Song 2014). Hymer (1960) was the first to explore why foreign firms are likely to
encounter a cost, a liability of foreignness, relative to host country firms. Hymer argues
that host country firms (domestic firms) have the general advantage of better information
about their country and its economy, language, laws, and politics. Zaheer (1995) argues
that this liability of foreignness has been the fundamental assumption driving theories of
the multinational corporation (e.g., Buckley and Casson 1976, Caves 1971, Dunning 1977,
Kostova 1999, Kostova and Zaheer 1999). Based on this assumption, some scholars have
tested whether manufacturing or professional services firms have experienced the liabil-
ity of foreignness (e.g., Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997, Mata and Portugal 2002, Miller and
Parkhe 2002, Rugman and Verbeke 2007, Barkema and Vermeulen 1998).
Zaheer (1995) classifies the sources of the liability of foreignness into four categories:
118
(1) firm-specific costs related to unfamiliarity with a local environment or lack of infor-
mation networks, (2) costs arising from spatial distance such as travel, transportation, and
coordination across time zones, (3) costs associated with the lack of legitimacy of foreign
firms, and (4) costs resulting from the home country environment. Among these factors,
Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) suggest that the liability of foreignness arises mainly from
the foreign firm not being sufficiently embedded in the information networks in the host
country.
Additionally, Miller and Parkhe (2002) point out that unfamiliarity also arises from
the host country’s perspective. They argue that one of the significant issues for multina-
tional subsidiaries is nationalistic or discriminatory behavior on the part of host country
consumers, firms, and institutions. For instance, in the mid-2010s, US subsidiaries experi-
enced Chinese customers’ discriminatory behavior towards US products, including Apple
iPhones, because the political and economic relationship between China and US became
more competitive than before.
Finally, barriers to international operation may arise from discrimination by the gov-
ernment (Miller and Parkhe 2002). Hymer (1960) notes that the general treatment that af-
fects both domestic and foreign firms is not essential. What is important is the fact that in
certain countries, foreign firms and domestic firms may receive very different treatment.
A notable example is the acquisition of Fox Television Network by News Corporation, an
Australian company controlled by Rupert Murdoch. To ensure that News Corporations’
acquisition of Fox Television Network met FCC guidelines, Murdoch became a U.S. citi-
zen, but he had to continue to defend Fox Television Network’s ownership (Larson 1995,
Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997).
119
This study focuses on the liability of foreignness arising from cultural differences.
First, to coordinate (or integrate) between the parent enterprise and foreign subsidiaries,
the parent enterprise is more likely to send home country executives and employees to
foreign subsidiaries. The change in ownership affects the style and culture of the acquired
companies. This change may result in hiring a different people and discovering less pop-
ular artists (in the host country). Second, the foreign ownership may directly affect the
host country consumers’ behavior; they might become more reluctant to purchase prod-
ucts or services from foreign-owned companies. As the empirical setting of this study is
the music industry, both effects will decrease the discovery of new local talent in the host
country.
Overcoming the Liability of Foreignness
The positive effect of foreign ownership on the discovery of new talent in the host
country mainly results from an advantage of the multinational corporation that can
compensate for the liability of foreignness. As reviewed above, the existence of a liability
of foreignness underlies the theory of international business (Hymer, 1960; Caves, 1971;
Hennart, 1982; Zaheer 1995; Chang et al. 2016). Most of the subsequent theoretical
and empirical work has focused on how multinational corporations might overcome or
compensate for this liability (e.g., Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997; Miller and Parkhe 2002).
Scholars have highlighted potential advantages of the multinational corporation, such
as economies of scale or scope, superior technology, risk diversification, and operating
flexibility (Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994, Zaheer and Mosakowski 1997, Kogut and Kulatilaka
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2001, Chang et al. 2016). There are also compelling reasons and research that point to
the superior performance due to the synergy between the parent enterprise in the home
country and foreign subsidiaries. This value has its roots in the internalization theory
of synergy, proposed by Caves (1971). According to this view, the parent enterprise can
contribute to (or increase) foreign subsidiaries’ superior performance in the presence
of substantial intangible assets, marketing skills, and management quality (Morck and
Yeung, 1991a, 1991b). Chang et al. find that this approach also encompasses the transfer
of intangible assets, such as tacit or explicit knowledge, and management capabilities that
have been the main topic of recent studies (Kogut and Zander 1992, Zander and Kogut
1995, Almeida, Song, and Grant 2002, Mezias 2007, Song and Shin 2007).
This line of theoretical and empirical research assumes that the business of foreign
subsidiaries is similar to the business of the parent enterprise; thus, it is rather easy to
predict the benefit from exploiting the tangible or intangible advantage of the parent
enterprise. This line of reasoning can extend to the synergy between different businesses
such as the synergy between computer hardware and software or the synergy between
television networks and contents. This study focuses on the synergy between hardware
manufacturing companies and content providers. The synergy between these two distinct
businesses was the vision of Sony, which was the most profitable electronics company
in the 1980s. This study explores whether the synergy between Sony’s tangible and





The sample of the treatment group comprises CBS Records and its music sublabels located
in the US, and the sample of the control group consists of all other US labels. We collect
the data for the labels above from the MusicBrainz database for the period between 1977
and 1998, which covers the period from ten years before to ten years after Sony’s acqui-
sition of CBS Records. Artists and repertoire (A&R) is the division of a record label that
is responsible for talent discovery and overseeing the development and management of
artists. Thus, the sample includes only record production labels that have an A&R division.
The unit of analysis for the empirical tests is the firm-year. The above selection criteria
leave us with 7,263 label-year observations associated with 2,624 record labels.
Variables
Independent variables
Our main explanatory variable is a dichotomous time-varying variable SONYit, which
captures whether Sony’s acquisition affects the discovery of domestic and new talent
in CBS Records. SONYit = ACQUISITIONt × CBSi, where ACQUISITIONt is
equal to one in all periods following Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records and zero before
the acquisition, and CBSi is equal to one if label i belongs to CBS Records.
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Dependent variables
A set of dependent variables measures the popularity of artists for each label-year. The
first set of dependent variables captures the popularity of artists and songs from each
label-year: the popularity of new artists in firm i, POPNEWit; the popularity of the
most popular incumbent artists in firm i, POPINCUMit; and the popularity of all artists
POPit. First, to calculate the average and maximum popularity of new artists and incum-
bent artists for the label-years, I collect the popularity score (familiarity score) of artists
from the Spotify Echonest API.The Spotify Echonest API offers a platform, which is called
the Rosetta Stone, to match Spotify Echonest IDs and MusicBrainz IDs. I use this platform
to calculate the popularity of the most popular artists and the average popularity of artists
for each firm. The range of individual artist popularity is from 0 to 1.
The second key dependent variable is the proportion of new artists PROPNEWit,
measured as the ratio of new artists to all artists of label i in year t. A new artist is a singer
or band who did not release a song before year t. By using the MusicBrainz database, I
count the numbers of new artists in proportion to all artists of each label.
Control variables
I control for variables: (1) a dummy that equals 1 if label i produces at least one single
release in year t, (2) the number of songs as a firm size proxy, (3) the mean number of
artists’ prior releases as a firm status proxy, (4) the Herfindahl index for genres in the




This study estimates the change in the popularity of artists and the proportion of new and
domestic artists in CBS Records and its sublabels after Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records.
Sony’s acquisition in 1988 is an exogenous shock to CBS Records. Thus, the treatment
group is the set of labels belonging to CBS Records. The control group is all other labels.
This study uses differences-in-differences estimators by including control variables
Xit, firm fixed effects Fi, country fixed effects Cc, genre fixed effects Git, and year fixed
effects Yt along with the explanatory variables SONYit, as in
POPNEWit = α + βxXit + βNSONYit + Fi + Cc +Git + Yt + eit,
POPINCUMit = α + βxXit + βNSONYit + Fi + Cc +Git + Yt + eit.
The total effect of Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records can be computed as βN . In the
case of (1) where the dependent variable is the popularity of new artists, the first differ-
ence compares the popularity of new artists of CBS Records hired before and after Sony’s
acquisition (treatment group) and that of other labels hired before and after Sony’s ac-
quisition (control group). This yields two differences, one for the control group and one
for the treatment groups. The second difference takes the difference between these two
differences. The result is an estimate of the effect of Sony’s acquisition on the popularity
of artists in CBS Records.
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Sample statistics
Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics on all the variables for the sample at the firm-year
level. First, the descriptive statistics for the independent variable show that the propor-
tion of the treatment group’s firm-year observations (sublabels belonging to CBS Records
during the sample period) is 0.5%. Moreover, the proportion of firm-year observations
after Sony’s acquisition is 87.6%.
Second, this study uses the four firm-level dependent variables. The first set of vari-
ables concerns the firm-level popularity of new and incumbent artists, and there are three
variables: the average popularity of new artists, average popularity of new artists, and
average popularity of all artists. The average of the firm-level average popularity of new
artists is 0.031; it has a large standard deviation, which is three times larger than the aver-
age value. The average of the firm-level average popularity of incumbent artists is higher
than that of new artists, at 0.084; it has a large standard deviation, which is approximately
1.5 times larger than the average value. Next, the average proportion of new artists is
42.7% (0.427), and the standard deviation has a similar size (0.435).
Third, this study uses four control variables. The first control variable is the dummy
for single-producing labels, and 31.2% of the labels produced at least one single. The sec-
ond control variable is the number of tracks produced per firm-year, and the average value
is 25.504. The third control variable is the average number of prior releases that each la-
bel’s artists produced. The average value is 5.133. Forty percent of artists are new artists
who have the potential to be famous but have no proven records. Incumbent artists have
ten prior releases on average. The fourth control variable is the Herfindahl index for the
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genre, and the average value is 0.142.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable name Level of variation Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Independent variables:
Dummy one if label i belongs to CBS Records Firm 0.005 0.071 0 1
Dummy one if after Sony’s acquisition Year 0.876 0.329 0 1
Dependent variables:
Average popularity of new artists Firm 0.031 0.093 0 0.88
Average popularity of incumbent artists Firm 0.084 0.138 0 0.88
Average popularity of all artists Firm 0.094 0.138 0 0.845
Average popularity of domestic artists Firm 0.111 0.145 0 0.824
Average popularity of foreign artists Firm 0.027 0.086 0 0.717
Proportion of new artists to all artists Firm 0.427 0.435 0 1
Control variables:
Dummy one if label produced at least one single in year t Firm 0.312 0.463 0 1
Number of tracks that label produced in year t Firm 25.504 46.242 0 1839
Average # of prior releases that label’s artists produced Firm 5.133 15.826 0 664
Herfindahl index for genre in label in year t Firm 0.142 0.316 0 1
Other variables:
Year Firm 1990.974 6.172084 1977 1998
Number of label-year observations 7,263
Number of unique labels 2,624
Number of unique artists 20,028
Number of unique releases 22,559
Number of unique songs 218,304
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3.5 Results
Did Sony weaken the discovery of new talent by CBS Records?
I test whether Sony’s acquisition undermined CBS Records’ discovery of new talent. Table
3.2 shows the results of testing the impact of Sony on the popularity of artists hired by
CBS Records. I estimate the three different versions of the popularity of artists and the
proportion of new artists.
First, Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates from the DD specifications with the depen-
dent variable, the average popularity of new artists. Column 1 reports the results from
a pooled OLS model, and Column 2 reports the results from a firm fixed effects model.
Columns 1 and 2 show the average effect of Sony’s acquisition on the average popularity
of new artists in CBS Records by comparing the popularity before and after Sony’s acqui-
sition. The coefficients on the interaction between the dummy for CBS Records and the
dummy for Sony’s acquisition are 0.0384 and 0.0261; both coefficients have positive values
and are significant at the 1% level. These coefficients imply that Sony did not weaken CBS
Records’ discovery of new talent but rather improved it. Given that the average popular-
ity of new artists in the labels is 0.031, Sony increased the popularity of new artists of CBS
Records by at least 84.19%.
Next, I explore the impact of Sony on the popularity of incumbent artists in CBS
Records. In Columns 3 and 4, the coefficients of the interaction between the dummy for
CBS Records and the dummy for Sony’s acquisition are -0.0048 and -0.0468, respectively;
these coefficients are negative, and the coefficient in the fixed effects model (Column 2) is































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































cumbent artists after Sony’s acquisition. Given that the average popularity of incumbent
artists in labels is 0.094, the change due to Sony’s acquisition decreased the popularity of
incumbent artists of CBS Records by at least 49.78%.
Third, I estimate the impact of Sony on the popularity of all artists in CBS Records.
Columns 5 and 6 report the coefficients of the interaction between the dummy for CBS
Records and the dummy for Sony’s acquisition (0.0307 and 0.0110); these coefficients are
positive but are not significant at the 5% level.
Finally, I estimate the impact of Sony on the proportion of new artists in CBS Records.
Columns 5 and 6 report the coefficients of the interaction between the dummy for CBS
Records and the dummy for Sony’s acquisition (0.0755 and 0.1157, respectively); although
these coefficients are positive, they are not significant at the 5% level. These coefficients
imply that Sony’s acquisition did not lead to an increase in the proportion of new artists
but that it led to an increase in the discovery performance. Sony may have invested more
money in discovering more talented artists. All in all, the results in Table 2 suggest that
CBS Records became less reliant on incumbent artists after Sony’s acquisition.
Did Sony weaken CBS Records’ discovery of domestic (US) new talent?
I turn now to the impact of Sony’s acquisition on the balance between domestic (Amer-
ican) new artists and foreign new artists. In Table 3, using DD specifications, I test the
hypothesis that Sony’s acquisition weakened CBS Records’ discovery of domestic (Amer-
ican) talent. Table 3 shows the results of testing the impact of Sony’s acquisition on the
popularity of artists hired by CBS Records. I estimate the impact of Sony’s acquisition
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on the popularity of domestic new artists, the popularity of foreign new artists, and the
proportion of new artists.
First, Columns 1 and 2 report the estimates from DD specifications with the dependent
variables, the average popularity of domestic artists. Column 1 reports the results from
a pooled OLS model, and Column 2 reports the results from a firm fixed effects model.
The coefficients on the interaction between the dummy for CBS Records and the dummy
for Sony’s acquisition are 0.0257 and 0.0106, respectively; both coefficients have positive
values, and the second coefficient is significant at the 5% level. These coefficients imply
that Sony’s acquisition at least did not weaken CBS Records’ discovery of domestic talent.
Next, I explore the impact of Sony’s acquisition on the popularity of foreign artists
hired by CBS Records. In Columns 3 and 4, the coefficients of the interaction between the
dummy for CBS Records and the dummy for Sony’s acquisition are -0.0143 and -0.0273,
respectively; these coefficients are negative, and the second coefficient is significant at
the 5% level. These results suggest that CBS Records became less reliant on foreign artists
after Sony’s acquisition. Given that the average popularity of incumbent artists in the
labels is 0.084, Sony’s acquisition led the popularity of new artists of CBS Records to de-
crease by at least 32.5%.
Finally, I estimate the impact of Sony’s acquisition on the proportion of foreign new
artists in CBS Records. Columns 5 and 6 report the coefficients of the interaction between
the dummy for CBS Records and the dummy for Sony’s acquisition (-0.0960 and -0.0200,
respectively); the first coefficient is significant at the 5% level. This coefficient implies
that Sony’s acquisition did not lead to an increase in the proportion of foreign new artists.

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in all, the results in Table 3 suggest that CBS Records became more reliant on domestic
new artists after Sony’s acquisition (and less reliant on foreign artists).
Subgroup analysis: (1) New vs. Incumbent artists and (2) Domestic vs.
Foreign artists
In Table 3.4, I divide artists into four categories: domestic new artists, domestic incumbent
artists, foreign new artists, and foreign incumbent artists. I calculate the average popular-
ity scores for these four groups and use them as dependent variables. Every two columns
show the results for each dependent variable.
First, in Columns 1 and 2, the coefficients for the interaction term between the dummy
for CBS Records and the dummy for Sony’s acquisition are 0.0402 and 0.0258, respectively.
The first coefficient is significant at the 5% level, and the second coefficient is significant
at the 10% level. These coefficients imply that Sony’s acquisition improved the discovery
of domestic new talent.
Second, Columns 3 and 4 show that the coefficients of the interaction term are -0.0039
and -0.0370, respectively, and both coefficients are not significant at the 5% level. These
coefficients imply that Sony’s acquisition did not change the discovery of incumbent do-
mestic talent.
Third, Columns 5 and 6 show that the coefficients of the interaction term are -0.0061
and -0.0013, respectively, and both coefficients are not significant at the 5% level. These
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fourth, Columns 7 and 8 show that the coefficients of the interaction term are -0.0199
and -0.0358, respectively, and the second coefficient is significant at the 5% level. These
coefficients imply that after Sony’s acquisition, CBS Records became less reliant on in-
cumbent foreign talent.
Finally, Figure 3.1 shows the dynamic effect of Sony’s acquisition of CBS Records on
the discovery of US new talent. It suggests that CBS records’ discovery of US new talent
increased after Sony’s acquisition. Also, Figure 3.2 shows the dynamic effect of Sony’s ac-
quisition of CBS Records on the discovery of US new talent. It suggests that CBS Records’
discovery of foreign new talent did not increase after Sony’s acquisition.
Figure 3.1: Dynamic impact of Sony’s Acquisition of CBS Records on the Discovery of
US New Talent
Note: Figure 3.1 plots estimated year by year pre- and post-Sony’s acqusition of CBS Records in the dis-
covery of US new talent from OLS regressions with fixed effects and controls. Each point represents the
estimated difference between the treated group (labels of CBS Records) and control group (other labels) in
each year.
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Figure 3.2: Dynamic Impact of Sony’s Acquisition of CBS Records on the Discovery of
Foreign New Talent
Note: Figure 3.2 plots estimated year by year pre- and post-Sony’s acqusition of CBS Records in the discov-
ery of foreign new talent from OLS regressions with fixed effects and controls. Each point represents the
estimated difference between the treated group (labels of CBS Records) and control group (other labels) in
each year.
Release level analysis
Table 5 shows the results at the release level. The unit of analysis is the release, and the
model controls firm-level attributes. The classification is the same as that in the former
subsection. There are four subsamples: releases by domestic new artists, releases by do-
mestic incumbent artists, releases by foreign new artists, and releases by foreign incum-
bent artists. Additionally, for robustness, I use two dependent variables: the popularity of
the release (from Spotify API) in Columns 1-4 and a dummy for the top 30% of the popular
releases in Columns 5-8. The results suggest that the popularity scores for the first three
groups (domestic new artists, domestic incumbent artists, and foreign new artists) in CBS




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparison with other foreign acquisitions during the period
1980-2015
I run the same regression models used in the previous four subsections to analyze other
major acquisition deals among the major labels in the music industry. Table 6 lists all
acquisition deals (10 deals) among major labels. Table 6 reports all the coefficients for
the interaction term between the dummy for CBS Records and the dummy for Sony’s ac-
quisition. Column 1 reports the results from the model with the dependent variable, the
average popularity of all artists in the acquired label. None of the coefficients are negative
and significant, but four coefficients are positive and significant at the 5% level. This result
offers suggestive evidence that foreign acquisition was helpful in improving the overall
popularity of the artists in the acquired labels.
Columns 2-4 report the results from the model with the three dependent variables:
the average popularity of new artists, the average popularity of incumbent artists, and the
proportion of new artists. First, four coefficients in Column 2 are positive and significant
at the 5% level, but no coefficients are negative and significant. Second, two coefficients
in Column 3 are negative and significant at the 5% level, but one coefficient is positive
and significant. Third, five coefficients in Column 4 are positive and significant at the 10%
level, but no coefficients are negative and significant. In sum, the results in Columns 2-4
offer suggestive evidence that the discovery of new talent and experimenting with new
artists improved after the acquisitions.
Columns 5-7 report the results from the model with the three dependent variables:
the average popularity of new artists, the average popularity of incumbent artists, and
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the proportion of new artists. First, four coefficients in Column 5 are positive and sig-
nificant at the 5% level, but only one coefficient is negative and significant. Second, two
coefficients in Column 6 are negative and significant at the 5% level, but no coefficient is
positive and significant. Third, three coefficients in Column 7 are positive and significant
at the 5% level, but only one coefficient is negative and significant. In sum, the results
in Columns 5-6 offer suggestive evidence that acquired labels improve the discovery of
domestic talent and experimenting with new artists after the acquisition. The results in
Column 7 are inconclusive; the direction is opposite to the results from Sony’s acquisition
of CBS Records.
Columns 8-11 reports the results from the model with the three dependent variables:
the average popularity of domestic new artists, the average popularity of domestic in-
cumbent artists, the popularity of foreign new artists, and the popularity of foreign new
artists. First, four coefficients in Column 8 are positive and significant at the 10% level, but
only one coefficient is negative and significant. Second, two coefficients in Column 9 are
negative and significant at the 5% level, and two coefficients are positive and significant
at the 5% level. Third, three coefficients in Column 10 are positive and significant at the
5% level, and three coefficients are negative and significant at the 5% level. Finally, three
coefficients in Column 11 are positive and significant at the 10% level, and two coefficients
are negative and significant at the 5% level. In sum, the results in Columns 8-11 offer sug-
gestive evidence that acquired labels improve the discovery of domestic new talent after
the acquisition. The results in Columns 9-11 are inconclusive; the direction is opposite to




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The empirical findings thus suggest that Sony’s acquisition did not decrease CBS Records’
discovery performance as compared to the performance of other US labels that were not
acquired by foreign owners. How does foreign ownership affect the discovery of host
country new talent by acquired firms? Theoretical research challenges the negative ef-
fect of the liability of foreignness. The positive impact of the access to Sony’s tangible
and intangible assets and the synergy between the hardware and content business may
outweigh the negative impact of the liability of foreignness and enhance the discovery
performance of CBS Records.
The results suggest that the positive effect of Sony’s acquisition would overshadow
the negative impact of the liability of foreignness. The estimates from the difference-
in-differences (DD) specifications suggest that Sony’s acquisition did not decrease CBS
Records’ discovery of new talent from the host country (the US) but that it increased the
average popularity of releases by American new artists hired by CBS Records. Addition-
ally, the reliance of CBS Records on American new artists did not decrease; the proportion
of American new artists hired by CBS Records even after Sony’s acquisition did not de-
crease. In sum, the average popularity of new artists in CBS Records increased by at least
110%.
Additionally, this study tests whether the findings from Sony’s acquisition of CBS
Records can be generalized to other music acquisition deals. I collect data from the other
nine major acquisition deals in the music industry after the mid-1980s. I compare the co-
efficients from the same regression analyses on the ten acquisition deals including Sony’s
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acquisition of CBS Records. The impact of foreign ownership (foreign acquisition) on
the discovery performance in the host country (the popularity scores of the host country
new artists) tends to be positive; except for one case (Matsushita’s acquisition of MCA
Records), the coefficients are negative and significant. In four cases, the coefficients are
positive and significant at the 10% level, suggesting that the impact of foreign ownership
tends to be positive.
I note a limitation to these findings. This study shares the same limitations as the other
two chapters of the dissertation. This study does not use music sales or cost data. Thus, the
increase in the popularity score from Spotify may not imply an increase in the financial
performance of CBS Records. Thus, the results may also reflect the fact that Sony invested
a great deal of money into the music business. Future work may be able to collect the sales
and cost data from the music companies and analyze the impact of foreign ownership on
the discovery of new talent from the host country more precisely.
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